



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER
NAVY EXPEDITIONARY COMBAT COMMAND
1575 GATOR BLVD, SUITE 150
VIRGINIA BEACH, VA 23459-3024

5720
Ser N01L
August 22, 2017

Mr. Nathan J. Hale
PSC 819 Box 2399
FPO AE 09645

Dear Mr. Hale:

This responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of June 29, 2017 in which you requested a copy of all evidence submitted and considered in the investigation surrounding your NEC removal and request for reinstatement conducted by EODMU 8. Your request was received by Navy Expeditionary Combat Command on June 29, 2017. Your request was assigned FOIA case file number DON-NAVY-2017-008015.

Our search located documents responsive to your request. However, our review of these documents indicate portions are exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(1) because they contain classified national security information, §552(b)(5) because the disclosure of said portions are part of the privileged predecisional deliberative process and §552(b)(6) because they would be a clearly unwanted invasion of privacy.

Accordingly, your request is granted in part and denied in part, you have the right to appeal this determination. You will find the responsive documents attached with redactions of the exempt portions and through the FOIA online system. You are advised of your right to appeal this determination, in writing, to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy (Code 14), 1322 Patterson Avenue SE, Suite 3000, Washington Navy Yard, D.C., 20374-5066.

Your appeal must be postmarked within 60 calendar days from the date of this letter to be considered. A statement as to why your appeal should be granted should be included and a copy of this letter should be attached. Both the appeal letter and the envelope should bear the notation "Freedom of Information Act Appeal."

You may direct any other questions concerning this matter to me at (757) 462-4316, Ext. 186, or jeffrey.sutton@navy.mil. You may also contact the DON FOIA Public Liaison, Christopher Julka, at (703) 697-0031 or christopher.a.julka@navy.mil.

Sincerely,

J. A. SUTTON
CDR, JAGC, USN
Force Judge Advocate
FOIA Coordinator

(b) (6)

USN EODMU8 ROTA

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU 8 ROTA
Sent: Tuesday, June 27, 2017 5:57 PM
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA; (b) (6) USN
EODMU8 ROTA
Subject: FW: PI ICO EODC Hale
Attachments: Hale.pdf
Signed By: (b) (6)

CO, CMC,

FYSA. (b) (6) has completed his updated PI ICO EODC Hale. I believe his final paragraph meets commander's intent; please advise if you'd like him to reattack.

TDQ and v/r,
XO

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA
Sent: Monday, June 26, 2017 2:24 PM
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU 8 ROTA
Subject: PI ICO EODC Hale

XO,

Rev 1 attached.

Very Respectfully,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

OIC, EODMU EIGHT DET EUROPE
Rota, Spain

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

USN EODMU8 ROTA

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA
Sent: Tuesday, May 23, 2017 11:11 AM
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Cc: (b) (6) USN EODMU 8 ROTA; (b) (6) CMDCM USN EODMU8 ROTA
Subject: RE: EODC Hale decision and redress - RFI's
Signed By: (b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)

(b) (6)

For clarification, you were not approached by EODC Hale about (b) (6) color issues prior to the DTRA training (ie already deployed)?

TDQ and VR/
CO

(b) (6)

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-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Sent: Tuesday, May 23, 2017 11:02 AM
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA
Cc: (b) (6) USN EODMU 8 ROTA; (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Subject: RE: EODC Hale decision and redress - RFI's

Sir,

1) EODC Hale did mention (b) (6) color blindness when we discussed reasons why (b) (6) should not be the LCPO. This was after DTRA training in Stuttgart and the main reason for this meeting was his verbal counsel on the team's performance at Nimble Elder. EODC Hale referenced the first troop scrambler we did, which he was not a part of. We all have very low scores due to low visibility and very little distinction between red and brown targets. This was a problem throughout the troop and (b) (6) scored middle of the pack.

I dismissed this as a non-issue because of the discussion I had with (b) (6)

(b) (6) when I took command of the platoon. He has a waiver for his color blindness. EODC Hale was not at the scrambler and I don't think it was mentioned it in the email to (b) (6). During our meeting, this was the only valid issue against (b) (6).

2) On 31 March 2017, (b) (6) did issue written counseling to EODC Hale with me as an observer. I did not receive responding statement from Chief Hale or supporting statement from (b) (6).

Thank you,
V/R

(b) (6)
EODMU EIGHT

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA
Sent: Monday, May 22, 2017 3:37 PM
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Cc: (b) (6) USN EODMU 8 ROTA; (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Subject: EODC Hale decision and redress - RFI's

(b) (6)

As previously discussed, I made the decision to remove EODC Hale from your previous PLT 842 and also removed his EOD NEC.

This decision was based on multiple factors leading me to lose confidence in his ability to exercise sound judgement and reliability to execute high-risk operations.

1) Contributing to this decision, but not paramount to it, was information from EODC Hale up his chain of command pertaining to (b) (6) color blindness as witnessed both at TEU2 (while you were still the PLT CDR) and during your first deployment.

EODC Hale sought an audience with me last week to give his side of the matters associated with my decision in seeking redress.

During that discussion, EODC Hale mentioned to me that he had brought up (b) (6) color blindness to (b) (6) "a year ago" (most likely during TEU2) but then in his redress statement he says that he brought (b) (6) vision up with you but you "dismissed it as a non-issue." He stated this dismissal was the reason for his approaching (b) (6), SOF Company LCPO, via email and, thus, circumventing the chain of command.

Please confirm the first time and any additional times EODC Hale approached you about (b) (6) vision issues. Additionally, inform me what your response/action was when this was brought up.

2) EODC Hale has included a statement in response to the written counseling he received on 31 March 2017 after the completion of Ex DI17.

Please confirm for me that you (and/or (b) (6)) issued the written counseling mentioned above. Also, confirm for me if/when you and/or (b) (6) received EODC Hale's responding statement. Was it hand-written, emailed, or in document format? Finally, did (b) (6) submit a voluntary statement with EODC Hale's responding statement?

TDQ and VR/
CO

(b) (6)
Commanding Officer
EODMU EIGHT / CTG 68.1
THUNDERSTEALERS

(b) (6)

TANDBERG IP 205.13.205.3 (Alias 1846)

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(b) (6)

USN EODMU8 ROTA

From: (b) (6) BUPERS, BUPERS-324
Sent: Monday, May 22, 2017 5:42 PM
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Subject: RE: Initial Force Conversion Package - CPO Hale
Signed By: (b) (6)(b) (6)

(b) (6)(b) (6)

Too easy (b) (6).

I will wait to hear from you.

V/R

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) (b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)
Sent: Monday, May 22, 2017 5:08 PM
To: (b) (6) BUPERS, BUPERS-324
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: Initial Force Conversion Package - CPO Hale

(b) (6)

Hold on this please! I will call you later to discuss.

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Sent: Monday, May 22, 2017 5:08 PM
To: (b) (6) BUPERS, BUPERS-324
Cc: (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Subject: Initial Force Conversion Package - CPO Hale

(b) (6)

Per our phoncon last week I'm attaching most of what normally constitutes a Force Conversion package, ICO Chief Hale (minus 1306/7). If you would please approach the following ECM's to determine any interest in his conversion: CTN, CTT, AWS, AWR and IT. Appreciate your assistance and we're standing by if any additional information is needed.

V/r

(b) (6)

EODMU EIGHT CCC

(b) (6)

WARNING: This is an official Department of Defense communication. Some emails may be encrypted and require CAC certification to view. Emails, or their attachments, containing personally identifiable information are "For Official Use Only" (FOUO) - Privacy Sensitive - Any misuse or unauthorized disclosure can result in both civil and criminal penalties.

(b) (6)

USN EODMU8 ROTA

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA
Sent: Thursday, May 18, 2017 6:24 PM
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA; (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6) USN EODMU 8 ROTA; (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Subject: RE: EODC Hale decision and redress - RFI

(b) (6)

Thank you for your assessment.
VR/
CO

TDQ

(b) (6)

Commanding Officer
EODMU EIGHT / CTG 68.1
THUNDERSTEALERS

(b) (6)

TANDBERG IP 205.13.205.3 (Alias 1846)

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-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Sent: Thursday, May 18, 2017 04:09 PM Coordinated Universal Time
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA; (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6) USN EODMU 8 ROTA; (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Subject: RE: EODC Hale decision and redress - RFI

CO,

OPSD addressed this issue with me when it came up during our Sustainment Phase Sir, and I told him I had no knowledge of (b) (6) color blindness, or "color deficiency." I worked for (b) (6) on a previous deployment at EODMU 12, where he was my LPO, and did not have knowledge of it then either. During ULT, EODC Hale and I were a 2-man team and (b) (6) and (b) (6) were a 2-man team for HR & sensitive switch defeat drills, where this deficiency was apparently recognized. I do not have any recollection of EODC Hale bringing the issue to my attention, and I would like to believe that this is something I would have taken note of immediately Sir.

(b) (6) later came back and informed me that (b) (7)(A) has a medical waiver for "color deficiency," and had gone back to optometry to ensure that his condition had not progressed. As I understand, he passed within the standards under which he was originally granted that waiver.

Sir, my impression is--and was at the time that I talked to (b) (6)--that EODC Hale and (b) (6) were digging for excuses to have (b) (6) removed from the team as their LCPO. I do not say that with any malicious intent toward either EODC Hale or (b) (6) as I like both on a personal level. Also, I cannot rightly blame EODC Hale as the sole cause of the issues that manifested with PLT 842, but my honest opinion is that I believe that he was the primary cause of the personality conflicts on that team Sir. If you would like any more clarification from my side Sir, I am here to provide whatever I can.

V/R,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

C-1/10 SFG, EOD PLT CDR

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA

Sent: Thursday, May 18, 2017 5:50 PM

To: (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA; (b) (6)

Cc: (b) (6) USN EODMU 8 ROTA; (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA

Subject: EODC Hale decision and redress - RFI

(b) (6)

As previously discussed, I made the decision to remove EODC Hale from your previous PLT 842 and also removed his EOD NEC. This decision was based on multiple factors leading me to lose confidence in his ability to exercise sound judgement and reliability to execute high-risk operations.

Contributing to this decision, but not paramount to it, was information from EODC Hale up his chain of command pertaining to (b) (6) color blindness as witnessed both at TEU2 (while you were still the PLT CDR) and during their first deployment.

EODC Hale sought an audience with me today to give his sides of the matters associated with my decision in seeking redress. During that discussion, EODC Hale mentioned to me that he had brought up (b) (6) color blindness to you "a year ago" most likely during TEU2. He stated this was resultant of interaction he had with (b) (6) and problems during the Basic Phase of training.

Can weigh-in on Chief Hale's above statement to me?

TDQ and VR/

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Commanding Officer
EODMU EIGHT / CTG 68.1
THUNDERSTEALERS

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

TANDBERG IP 205.13.205.3 (Alias 1846)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

COMMANDING OFFICER
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL
MOBILE UNIT EIGHT
PSC 819 BOX 10
FPO AE 09645-0010

27 Jun 17

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO ACCUSATIONS OF RETALIATION ICO EODC
HALE DTD 21 JUNE 2017

Ref: (a) MILPERSMAN 1220-200

1. I have reviewed Preliminary Inquiry findings provided by (b) (6), assigned as Preliminary Inquiry Officer of the above specified case, and discussed his recommendations with him on Monday, 26 June 2017. Given the information provided in (b) (6) Preliminary Inquiry report, our discussion, and the supporting information (i.e., formal counselling and Non-Punitive Letters of Caution (NPLOCs)) pertaining to EODC(EWS) Nathan J. Hale and (b) (6) performance while assigned to Platoon EIGHT-FOUR-TWO (PLT 842), I will not direct any additional Command Investigations into the allegation of retaliation. I do not believe sufficient actionable evidence exists to warrant disciplinary action under Uniform Code of Military Justice.

2. I do believe sufficient information has been provided to determine that both EODC Hale and (b) (6) actions and poor communication throughout the platoon's Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP) were direct contributors to the toxic environment and dissolution of trust on PLT 842 and undermined mission readiness. Specifically, EODC Hale's multiple formal counselling and NPLOC outlined failures in communication, accountability, coordination, and planning (b) (6)

3. Based on the above, I have exercised my authority as Commanding Officer to hold (b) (6) and EODC Hale accountable for their respective failures via the following administrative actions:

(b) (6)

b. Per reference (a), paragraph 14 e.(3), I have lost confidence in EODC Hale's ability to exercise sound judgement and be reliable to execute the duties of a Master EOD Technician (NEC 5337) due to his lack of decisive action to recommend personnel decontamination during Exercise DESERT ICE. The toxic nature of the platoon dynamics compel me to believe that EODC Hale believed that his opinion would not be valued by (b) (6) but that does not remove his responsibility and my expectation that he will address personnel hazards commensurate with his warfare qualification. Accordingly, I want to give EODC Hale the benefit of the doubt and have reverted him to NEC 5335 (Senior EOD Technician) and directed him to recomplete his Master EWS Warfare Qualification standards. EODC Hale will receive a Significant Problems Chief Evaluation and NAVPERS 1070/613 (Pg. 13) entry.

Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO ACCUSATIONS OF RETALIATION ICO EODC
HIALE DTD 21 JUNE 2017

4. For any questions or concerns on this matter, please contact my command Legal Officer, (b) (6)
(b) (6), DSN: 314-727-1868 or NIPR: (b) (6) or myself at DSN: 314-727-1929
or NIPR: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL MOBILE UNIT EIGHT DETACHMENT EUROPE
PSC 819 BOX 36 UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION ROTA SPAIN
FPO AE 09645-0001

5830
Ser EOD/530
21 Jun 17

From: Officer in Charge, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile
Unit EIGHT, Detachment Europe
To: Commanding Officer, Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Mobile Unit EIGHT

Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO ACCUSATIONS OF RETALIATION
AGAINST EODC HALE

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7E, Chapter II
(b) UCMJ

Encl: (1) Appointing Order
(2) EODC Hale Request for Redress with Enclosures
(3) EODC Hale NEC Removal & Counseling Documents

1. This reports completion of the preliminary inquiry conducted in accordance with references (a) and (b) into accusations of retaliation against EODC Hale.

2. Personnel contacted:

Jun 12 17: (b)(6)

Jun 13 17: EODC Nathan Hale, USN,

Jun 14 17: (b)(6)

Jun 19 17:

3. Materials reviewed:

Encl (1): Appointing Order

Encl (2): Request for Redress and Reinstatement of NEC 5337
Email correspondence between EODC Hale and (b)(6)

(b)(6), Jan 30, 2017

Voluntary Statement of (b)(6)

Statement in Response to the Encl (3) Record of
Counseling ICD EODC Hale (b)(6), Mar 20, 2017

Encl (3): EODC Executive Summary of Platoon F-11 Incident, Mar

02, 2016

EODTEU Executive Summary of Platoon Performance, Mar 18, 2016

Email correspondence between (b) (6), USA, and (b) (6), Feb 06, 2017

Email correspondence between (b) (6), USA, and (b) (6), Feb 09, 2017

Email correspondence between (b) (6) and (b) (6), Feb 10, 2017

Record of Counseling ICO EODC Hale (b) (6), Feb 16, 2017

Record of Counseling ICO EODC Hale (b) (6), N/A

Non-Punitive Letter of Caution ICO EODC Hale (b) (6) (b) (6), USN), Mar 01, 2017

Informal Record of Counseling ICO EODC Hale (b) (6) (b) (6), Mar 2017

Record of Counseling ICO EODC Hale (b) (6), Mar 30, 2017

Record of Counseling ICO EODC Hale (b) (6), Apr 12, 2017

4. Summary of findings: All interviews conducted in-person. Art. 31(b) rights were not administered; interviews remained formal and focused on materials reviewed through open discussion.

a. Introduction. The prevailing finding among all interviews conducted is that a serious lack of communication existed between PLT 842 members, resulting in a complete meltdown of teamwork and a deterioration of trust up and down the chain of command. Lapses in communication occurred as early as EODTEU training, during which (b) (6), be it out of frustration or an inability to unite the PLT, stopped speaking to EODC Hale, or (b) (6), for month-long periods of time. The absolute lack of communication persisted episodically. A growing mistrust between the PLT leadership and PLT members continued to develop, combatted with written and verbal counseling characterized more so as scolding than mentorship. NPLOC guidance instructed EODC Hale to improve communication with his chain of command; however, by the time PLT 842 began DI9, EODC Hale (N3) and (b) (6) (N4) had virtually no platform on which to stand. Each PLT member's motivation to excel as a team was instead replaced by each PLT member's need to survive working together under observation.

b. Background. (b) (6) reported deployment to redeploy as an emergency family officer and conduct a loss of

nots of turnover with EODC Hale; in fact, according to EODC Hale, turnover took place on the car ride to the airport. (b)(6), perhaps due to the private nature of his departure, did not inform (b)(6), his teammate. A formal N2 turnover did not take place between (b)(6) and EODC Hale, nor did it begin via email or phone correspondence after (b)(6) departure. (b)(6) and (b)(6) continued to communicate, but (b)(6) and EODC Hale failed to communicate with each other concerning LCPO tasks and responsibilities. As N2, EODC Hale's communication with SOF Company leadership was limited to brief emails and text messages. EODC Hale failed to communicate with SOF Company leadership and his LCPO; but he is no guiltier than his PLT CDR and LCPO to ensure proper turnover began or occurred and the proper battle rhythm of communication was established prior to (b)(6) departure.

The PLT functioned under EODC Hale's leadership and with the addition of (b)(6). While it is difficult to gauge exactly how well EODC Hale led as LCPO and communicated information to N3 and N4, the PLT's ability to work together, both professionally and informally, improved. Troop integration improved. Nevertheless, communication with (b)(6) and/or SOF Company leadership did not. (b)(6) maintained communication with (b)(6); however, he did not include EODC Hale on the evolving status of (b)(6) specifically the efforts and plan in motion for him to return. According to interviews, the PLT operated under the assumption that the current PLT manning would remain without changes. SOF Company leadership agreed that EODC Hale could manage N2 duties and current PLT manning would remain without changes. PLT members learned of (b)(6) return to PLT 842 as N2 not through (b)(6) or SOF Company leadership, but through rumor. This weakened the trust between PLT leadership and PLT members.

c. Findings. EODC Hale's email correspondence with (b)(6) is, not coincidentally, characteristic of his abilities to communicate. It is well-written, meticulous, poorly-timed, and generally speaking, the sole substantial correspondence he initiated with (b)(6). Without considering how the information he revealed may further topple the team dynamic of the original PLT 842, undermines trust with (b)(6) and (b)(6), and force SOF Company leadership into presenting new sensitive information to Command leadership, EODC Hale communicated his concerns primarily to protect the current team, specifically to protect (b)(6).

EODC Hale's email permanently damaged (b) (6) opinion of and working relationship with EODC Hale, and to a lesser extent (b) (6). Evidence suggests that attempts to communicate, mentor, and mesh stopped, replaced instead by written counseling in an attempt to remove EODC Hale from the team.

Information regarding when and how (b) (6) and (b) (6) learned of EODC Hale's email conflicts from interview to interview. According to interviews, (b) (6) regarded the email as a betrayal. There were claims during interviews of condescending and back-stabbing remarks made to individuals outside the PLT during the period between redeployment and DI9, targeting N3 and N4. Whether or not remarks were made, it is clear that the discord between PLT leaders and PLT members was evident to individuals outside the PLT.

EODC Hale received a NPLOC from the Commanding Officer, EODMU EIGHT, that instructed him to 1) support the stability of PLT 842, 2) ensure AA&E be properly inventoried, and 3) improve communication with his chain of command. (b) (6) and EODC Hale's leadership progress would be scrutinized during DI9. Interviews indicate that EODC Hale and (b) (6), frustrated with myriad counseling, a sense of mistrust, and no support or protection from their immediate chain of command, felt more obligated to comply than to bond as a unit with their PLT leadership.

According to interview and statement material, communication did not improve during DI9; moreover, there was very little if any communication between PLT leadership and PLT members. Any mission planning that occurred, however deliberate and/or scheduled, was not relayed to EODC Hale or (b) (6). EODC Hale, left with no inputs from N1 and N2, remained passive. He did not step up to fill the leadership void or the EOD SME void in front of him. Instead of focusing on rectifying shoddy pre-mission planning, voicing concerns of gross contamination, or generally winning back the attention and confidence of the Troop leadership, he focused on being N3 and executing N3 tasks. With the exception of N4, who obtained more information from cell leaders than his EOD leadership prior to assault and gave the only legitimate feedback during a post-assault discussion, PLT 842 as a unit failed to communicate confidently with the Troop and with each other due to the unchanged toxic team dynamic.

According to interviews, the D19 safety violations against EODC Hale noted in counseling statements may or may not constitute shortfalls in EOD technical knowledge. Conclusions can be made from interviews that EODC Hale's purported safety violations, while justified, were no less safe than safety violations committed by N1 and N2. Conclusions can be made from interviews that EODC Hale's purported safety violations were not safety violations and were in fact satisfactory procedures. There is not sufficient evidence and material provided to conclude EODC Hale does not meet the required skill and knowledge-level of a Master EOD Technician.

5. Recommendation: Recommendations are based on findings obtained exclusively from interviews and material provided.

Recommend Commanding Officer, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit EIGHT, further investigate allegations of retaliation against EODC Hale. Sufficient evidence indicates that EODC Hale was set up for failure, and his PLT leadership-struggling with an inability to build team camaraderie, imbue trust, and gain the confidence of the command, N3/N7 leadership, and the supported unit- instead looked to place the onus on EODC Hale and [REDACTED] and to specifically target EODC Hale.

[REDACTED]



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDING OFFICER
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL
MOBILE UNIT EIGHT
PSC 819 BOX 10
FPO AE 0845 0010

5830
Ser N00/322
2 Jun 17

From: Commanding Officer, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile
Unit EIGHT

To: (b) (6)

Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO ACCUSATIONS OF RETALIATION
AGAINST EODC HALE

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7F, Chapter II
(b) UCMJ
(c) EODC Hale Request for Redress

1. In accordance with reference (a), you are to inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding the subject above.
2. Consistent with section 0203 of reference (a), investigate the circumstances surrounding allegations of retaliation against EODC Hale as outlined in reference (c). Report your findings concerning this matter and recommendations as to whether additional investigation is required or alternatively, whether administrative or disciplinary actions are merited. Use the letter format contained in reference (a), appendix A-2-c, to report your findings, opinions, and recommendations by 16 June, 2017 unless an extension of time is granted.
3. You may seek legal advice from (b) (6) the COMNAVACTSPAIN Staff Judge Advocate, or (b) (6) USN, EODGRU TWO Staff Judge Advocate, during the course of your investigation.

(b) (6)

Acting

MILPERSMAN 1220-200

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD) RATING

Responsible Office	BUPERS-324E Enlisted Community Manager	Phone:	DSN COM	882-2827 (901) 874-2827
Point of Contact	NAVPERSCOM (PERS-401DH) EOD "A" School Coordinator	Phone:	DSN COM	882-4261 (901) 874-4261
NAVPERSCOM CUSTOMER SERVICE CENTER		Phone:	Toll Free	1-866-U ASK NPC

Reference (s)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) NAVPERS 18068F, Manual of Navy Enlisted Manpower and Personnel Classifications and Occupational Standards, Volume II, Navy Enlisted Classifications (b) COMNAVCRUITCOMINST 1130.8J, Navy Recruiting Manual - Enlisted (c) NAVMED P-117, Manual of the Medical Department, Chapter 15 (d) U.S. Navy Diving Manual (e) OPNAVINST 1160.8A (f) SECNAVINST 5510.30B (g) SECNAVINST 5510.35B (h) BUPERSINST 1430.16F (i) DJMS Procedures Training Guide (PTG) (j) NECCINST 1414.2 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Warfare Specialist (EWS) Qualification (k) OPNAVINST 5350.4D
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13. **Change of Rating.** Personnel designated in the EOD rating may request change of rating per MILPERSMAN 1440-010. Personnel are required to submit NAVPERS 1221/6 to BUPERS-324E to concurrently affect change of rating and removal of the EOD rating related NEC.

14. **Forced Conversion.** Forced conversion is the NAVPERSCOM directed involuntary change of rating based on a member's loss of eligibility or suitability to further serve in member's present rating as defined in MILPERSMAN 1440-010. Forced conversions will be conducted per MILPERSMAN 1440-010 and as further described in this article. COs may recommend forced conversion/revocation of the EOD rating NEC by submitting a NAVPERS 1221/6 to BUPERS (BUPERS-324E). Service members assigned NEC 0000 have 30 days to request conversion to an undermanned rating per MILPERSMAN 1440-010 and command shall remove advancement recommendation until member successfully converts to new rating. This revocation shall not be used as a punitive measure, but based on the CO's determination that the member is no longer suitable for assignment in the EOD rating. NAVPERS 1221/6 must substantiate that determination by providing sufficient background and reasonable justification for removal of member's NEC. Recommendations to revoke NEC shall include at a minimum the following statements:

"The member is considered suitable for assignment to rate or rating billets not requiring NEC (fill-in)."

or

"The member is considered unsuitable for reassignment and will be recommended for administrative discharge by separate action."

and

"The member may reapply for reinstatement of NEC (fill-in) after completing at least 2 years assigned to a non-NEC billet."

or

"The member is unsuitable for duty in Diver/EOD/SEAL/SWCC/UCT commands. The member may not reapply for reinstatement for NEC 53XX and is unsuitable for duty in Diver/EOD/SEAL/SWCC/UCT commands."

Primary reasons for forced conversion/revocation of NEC include, but are not limited to, the following:

a. **Non-Performance of Duties.** Failure or unwillingness to perform duties required of the rating.

b. **Failure to Maintain Rating Eligibility.** Permanent revocation by Department of the Navy, Central Adjudication Facility (DON CAF) of the member's security clearance or permanent physical disability.

c. **Professional Performance:**

(1) Willful dereliction of duty.

(2) Breaches of ammunition, arms, explosive (AA&E), diving, parachute, or ordnance safety or regulations.

(3) Loss of CO's confidence in the member's ability to exercise sound judgment, reliability, and personal conduct.

d. **EOD Warfare Specialist (EWS) Qualification.** Failure to attain EWS qualification as specified in reference (j).

e. **Alcohol Abuse.** Personnel identified as having abused alcohol will be locally suspended from duty by their CO pending the outcome of screening, disciplinary action, or rehabilitation procedures as outlined in reference (k). At any time, during or upon completion of those proceedings, COs have the following options:

(1) If a **counseling/rehabilitation program appears likely to succeed**, the member will remain assigned to the command in a non-EOD NEC status and will have a program developed per reference (k). Commands will submit NAVPERS 1221/6 to BUPERS (BUPERS-324E) to affect suspension of the EOD rating related NEC. Upon successful completion of the rehabilitation program, the CO may request reinstatement of the member's EOD rating related NEC.

(2) If future alcohol abuse is considered likely, or the member fails rehabilitation treatment, the CO may certify that the member has no potential for further useful service and must initiate separation procedures. Commands will submit NAVPERS

14 May 17

From: CPO(EXW/FPJ) Nathan James Hale, USN
To: Commanding Officer, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit EIGHT

Subj: REQUEST FOR REDRESS AND REINSTATEMENT OF NEC 5337

Ref: (a) Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 138
(b) JAGMAN 0302
(c) Non-Punitive Letter of Caution of 1 Mar 17
(d) SECNAVINST 5370.7D

Encl: (1) Email of (b) (6) of 19 Jan 17
(2) Voluntary statement of (b) (6), USN, of 9 Apr 17
(3) Statement in response to Written Counseling given on 31 Mar 17

1. Per references (a) and (b), this request for redress is submitted. Specifically, I respectfully request the reinstatement of NEC 5337 for the reasons stated below.

2. After receiving reference (c), I took into account the deficiencies cited and continued to support my team in meeting all of its future mission requirements and responsibilities. Furthermore, I made a concerted effort to rebuild the respect and trust that had deteriorated over the last several months.

3. The team worked to complete Exercise DESERT ICE 17, the communication issues remained and ultimately kept us from a successful evaluation. The team's communication issues have existed for some time, but were exacerbated when I sent enclosure (1) to (b) (6), USN. That email was sent out of concern for the safety of the team. Previously, I told (b) (6), USN, about (b) (6) vision issue, but he dismissed it as a non-issue. Thus, I was left with no choice than to use my chain of command and notify (b) (6), (b) (6). Rather than improve our team and solve a legitimate safety issue, my email to (b) (6) caused (b) (6) and (b) (6) to turn against me. When (b) (6) returned, he and (b) (6) were more preoccupied with their agenda in ensuring the blame of team failure would not be on them, rather than mission success.

4. Nevertheless, I attempted to work toward a solution with my LCPO and OIC in order to reach an agreement on how best to communicate. Their response was to leave myself and (b) (6) out of crucial decision-making processes, out of pre-mission planning, and provide the least amount of intel until the very last second. As (b) (6) documents in enclosure (2), we were left with getting information from the Army personnel because our team leadership refused to keep us informed. Thus, as a team, we failed. But as an individual, I maintained physical standards, while meeting all the other requirements such as punctuality, equipment preparation, and readiness.

5. (b) (6) and (b) (6) observed that we, as a team, did poorly on the D19 drill conducted 29 March 2017, specifically because the OIC and LCPO failed to make critical recommendations prior to the commencement of the drill regarding the establishment of a

decontamination station. I was also counseled regarding the same mistake which I accepted without statement. As noted in enclosure (3), the entire two weeks in Dugway, despite my requests, I was not invited to any pre-mission planning meetings nor debriefed after the fact. Despite conducting the drill twice that day, the LCPO or OIC provided no corrections or feedback to FODI Vasenda or me. Two days later (b) (6) and (b) (6) gave me a written counseling without any prior communication or notice of wrong doing. My response statement for this particular counseling was prepared at a later time that we agreed upon for inclusion, but was never accepted. This episode illustrates the communication issues within our team and confirms my reasons for feeling *set up for failure*.

6. Our team deployed with B/2/3 from 18 September 2016 to 9 February 2017 and received only good reviews and verbal compliments. Specifically, several members noted the positive differences in our team after I took over the LCPO position from (b) (6). I did make a request of the RECCE Team SGT that if asked about my team, to continue to give his positive feedback of the current team dynamic. His final appraisal of our team was based on solely (b) (6) comments about me, not our actual performance.

7. (b) (6) and (b) (6) were the leaders of our team that failed and yet they were allowed to continue in the EOD community. Conversely, I had my NEC removed based, in large part, on their opinions of my performance. Opinions that are tainted by my report of (b) (6) vision issue to the chain of command. Under reference (d), I am required to report violations of regulations to the proper authority and I am protected from unfavorable personnel actions based on that report. It is clear that my report of (b) (6) condition led to (b) (6) and (b) (6) retaliating against me, which negatively impacted our team and ultimately resulted in our team's failure and the removal of my NEC.

8. I can only conclude that you made the best judgement you could with what little information you had. This is where my uncertainty lies with your call to terminate me completely and rely on the information given to you by two individuals you saw fit to separate. I hope this letter touches on the subjects you needed the most clarity on. I promise to continue to conduct myself in a manner that makes the Navy proud, remain an asset to my Country and to serve no matter what outcome you determine proper at the close of this request. I hope my future lies within the EOD community and respectfully request you reinstate my NEC, so I may earn back your trust.


N. J. HALE

Encl. 1

Hale, Nathan J CPO USN EODMU8 ROTA

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Sent: Friday, January 20, 2017 3:32 AM
To: Hale, Nathan J CPO USN EODMU8 ROTA
Subject: RE: Redeployment/Sustainment schedule - personnel shift info

Nate,

First off - I understand and appreciate your position WRT (b) (6). With the exception of the vision issues and the specifics of the range timelines, I have been aware of the majority of shortfalls noted throughout PLT 842s history with (b) (6) as the team Chief. I appreciate the effort you put forth in bringing these facts to light. It doesn't take long in reading your report to see that you feel strongly that (b) (6) resuming the LCPO spot would be detrimental to the success of the team throughout the remainder of your OFRP. However, I also know that the decision as to the future of PLT 842 will ultimately be made by direction of the CO. That being said, upon my return to Rota next week I will be speaking with the Triad directly in order to make sure all of the information pertinent to that decision is addressed before the final order is given.

As a bro, I am going to give you some important advice in how you and the rest of your team best handle this situation. Before anyone on your team (From N1-N4) puts any of this information on blast, you need to assess very carefully how go about it. You never know who is listening, how they will interpret this information, or what the 2nd, 3rd, or 4th level effects will play in the political circles of our community. You know as well as I that rumors in EOD spread faster than syphilis on an aircraft carrier. It is in all of our best interests to keep our dirty laundry contained until we get to the laundromat or else risk making the whole team stink.

The decision to reinstate (b) (6) as the team Chief was made hastily by what I assume was a semi misinformed Triad while the SEA and Co Commander were both not present. We still have three months before the final outcome will come to pass (DI9 exercise). Between then and now you can rest assured that all of this information will be considered and a call will be made. Regardless of how it plays out I would implore you continue to do all you can to keep the team in the fight. You guys have been doing great in the past few months. Keep it up.

I will be in touch after I return to Rota and get the latest info.

Peace out,

(b) (6)

From: Hale, Nathan J CPO USN EODMU8 ROTA
Sent: Thursday, January 19, 2017 11:54 PM
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Subject: RE: Redeployment/Sustainment schedule - personnel shift info

(b) (6)

In response to your last email, I am obligated in voicing a few concerns with having (b) (6) return in fulfilling the duties of PLT 842 LCPO again. Having filled in as the LCPO for the last half of our deployment, several issues were brought to my attention, not only by my team members but also the troop.

Inability to communicate:

It is no secret that (b) (6) as the team N2 had a major personality clash specifically with (b) (6) and belittled him at every opportunity. With the team functioning smoothly, I now can honestly attribute this issue as a failure in (b) (6) communication. Prior to (b) (6) leaving Baumholder, he was on a "no speaking basis" with (b) (6) and opted in having me mediate between them instead of addressing him personally. I have also personally experienced being given "the silent treatment" when I questioned some of his methods back in March 2016 during FTX Week at Ft. Story. It was a solid month before he spoke directly to me again, having (b) (6) mediate between us, refusing to address me personally. There was also no communication prior to his departure on his intention of leaving or any concrete plan in place in the event of being recalled. Enclosed (document #1) you will find his counselling statement given during our ULT Phase for lack of communication with the platoon, which will attest to the growing/uncorrected problem this has grown into.

Lack/un willingness to integrate with the Troop:

Out of the 10 range days we had scheduled with the troop prior to his departure, he had personally only attended 4 of them. This raised a few "red-flags" with the troop and attributed to the concern with fully integrating with their cells due to the lack of participation during range days. Enclosed (document #2) is the range schedule with days (b) (6) missed.

Inability to distinguish between colors:

When we had first teamed-up in June 2015, he had confided to me that he had difficulty distinguishing certain colors, specifically the color red. I did not think much of it then, believing he had the medical waivers required. During 18-19NOV2015 while on the road show training at Point One, he had teamed-up with (b) (6) in conducting wire-diagnostics and was completely unable to distinguish their colors and then later confided in (b) (6) that he was color blind and would need (b) (6) step in to replace him as P1 during all the remaining wire-diagnostic drills because he was physically unable to.

21NOV2016: B/2/3 conducted a timed scrambler which consisted of colored targets. During the evolution, the RSO called out proper colored targets that were to be engaged per barricade. Upon completion of the drill, (b) (6) confronted (b) (6) as to why he was not shooting the proper targets. (b) (6) was told that if he were a member of the troop, he would have been kicked off the range because of his inability to distinguish the proper targets, which is a safety violation. (b) (6) replied that he is colorblind and is unable to differentiate the colored targets. This incident is corroborated by (b) (6) and (b) (6).

Numerous accomplishments have been made since the team dynamic changed.

- 12-16DEC2016: I organized our first fully integrated troop chemical/biological FMP utilizing DTRA/ATSG assets, working the logistics and training dates with the ATSG LCPO and RECCE Team Sgt.
- All 4 team members have participated in every troop range exercise since (b) (6) departure (dates attached in document #2).
- Conducted 3 team sustainment Hostage Rescue drills.
- Conducted 2 "Blue Fly" Response time drills.
- Conducted 2 team CBRNE O300 response drills.
- 17-20JAN2017: Participated in the DTRA "Nimble Elder" Exercise held in Stuttgart, DE.
- 19JAN2017: administered the EODC advancement exam to (b) (6).

In conclusion, my strong personal recommendation would be for the team to carry on as it now stands (myself remaining the N2 and (b) (6) as the N3). The team has made a complete 180, doing good work, and can only see it coming out here for its second deployment, stronger and better prepared. The fact that we all now get along, communicate, and socialize regularly is only an added bonus! Feel free to contact me with any follow up questions or concerns.

Date

V/r,

Encl 1

EODC Nate Hale
PLT 842 LCPO
EODMUB ISO USA 35FG B 2/3

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6) USN EODMUB ROTA
Sent: Wednesday, January 11, 2017 5:06 PM
To: (b) (6) USN EODMUB ROTA; Hale, Nathan J CPO USN EODMUB ROTA
Cc: (b) (6) USN EODMU 8 ROTA
Subject: Redeployment/Sustainment schedule - personnel shift info

Gents,

(b) (1)(A)

(b) (5)

V/R

(b) (6)

Encl. 2

09APR17

There was virtually no communication between N1/N2 and N3 during Desert Ice 9. N1 and N2 did not include N3 in any pre-mission briefings and I, N4, had to act as a go between for both parties. I often was left out of the loop as well and had to speak directly with cell leaders in the troop for information regarding the schedule and what was coming next. Our team was not functioning well as a unit and I feel as if our collective team failures were being pushed onto N3 and he was being used as a scapegoat.

For example, N3 was given a written counseling that was not warranted in order to paint N3 into a bad light and make him appear 'unsafe' which couldn't be farther from the truth. Here is my account of that drill:

EOD was assigned to C2 element during the assault of the cave. There was unknown chemical warfare agent being produced and weaponized. During the assault two assaulters entered a vapor barrier and engaged a hostile. The hostile threw a glass of an unknown liquid onto the assaulters. The assaulters were now grossly contaminated with an unknown liquid. C42 (Troop SGT Major) tasked N4 and N3 to the area of the incident. A few minutes later N3 and N4 arrived to the vapor barrier. 2 additional assaulters were outside the vapor barrier and were panicking. The JCAD began to ring 1 bar for G Agent meaning there was a vapor hazard outside of the vapor barrier. The 2 Assaulters inside the vapor barrier were yelling that they got sprayed with a liquid. N3 and N4 calmed everyone down and gave directions to the assaulters inside to do a self and buddy decon and then shed the outer layer of gloves and stand by for further instructions. N4 then noticed a large puddle of liquid coming from the vapor barrier room on the ground. He pushed the 2 assaulters outside of the vapor barrier back and made sure they had not stepped in the liquid. He gave direction for them to back out of the cave a bit and not let anyone else into the vapor hazard area. At this point N3 had already set up a drop cloth so that the tools could be easily accessed. N3 and N4 conducted an m8 swipe on the liquid and it popped positive RED for Blister. Later in the debrief this result was clarified by scientists as a false positive because of the stimulant used in place of real agent and should have popped positive GREEN for nerve agent. Sorbent was then spread on the puddle and drop cloths were laid out to mitigate the spread of contamination and to be able to safely enter the vapor barrier. Once in the vapor barrier room, N4 and N3 quickly assessed the situation and the 2 dirty assaulters. There were multiple 155 rounds being filled with an unknown liquid, a wagon with a bunch of pressurized containers with a spray hose attached to it and a dead hostile with an empty glass by his hand. N3 checked the assaulters for symptoms and quickly decontaminated them again to make sure they did it correctly. N3 and N4 did not see any immediate threats in the room and the priority at that point was to get the assaulters to the hotline to process out. The 2 assaulters were instructed by N3 to give us a quick brief of what happened and then to get cut out of their suits immediately outside. The liquid was either Nerve, Blister or an unknown chemical so N3 and N4 wanted them to be cut out to prevent any medical emergencies. The assaulters left the cave. N3 and N4 stayed in the vapor area and ran further testing and gathered all necessary intelligence for the next 30 or so minutes. When N3 and N4 left the cave they came outside to find no hotline set up and everyone joking around. The 2 dirty assaulters that were grossly contaminated with liquid agent were not even notionally cut out of their suits and no decontamination of any kind ever took place which is a HUGE safety hazard and overall failure of the N2 and N1. The drill was indexed at that point and the assaulters considered the assault portion of the drill a win. When asked for debriefing points no other EOD Techs said a word about the situation until N4 began to explain the severity of what had just happened and why the drill was not a win. The entire point of the drill was to see how the entire force would react in a tactical environment when multiple personnel were grossly contaminated with liquid agent. N4 explained how it was a failure and that for future drills an expedient hotline needs to be established during assault for emergency decontamination situations. Once again, this responsibility falls on N1 and N2 who are supposed to make recommendations to the Troop leadership.

The troop took N4's debrief point on board and decided to hit the target again after a break for food and water. At this time N1, N2, N3 & N4 had a meeting to discuss what went wrong and what needs to

Encl. 2

happen moving forward N1 and N2 seemed mad at N4 for bringing up those points during the debrief even though it was the proper thing to do. It was very confusing because they both agreed 100% with what N4 said but said that he shouldn't have said it because it might make somebody look bad in front of observers. N4 respectfully disagreed with them and said that it needed to be said.

N4 approached (b) (6) and (b) (6) after this conversation to see if he was out of line during the debrief. They both said absolutely not and agreed with N4 and told him it was the right thing to say.

N4 was also approached by an Army O4 with DTRA and an Army O6 that was observing the drill and was commended on his spot on threat assessment in regards to him calling out everyone on the post assault decontamination procedures.

N1, N2, N3 and N4 had another meeting prior to the next assault. N4 asked N2 what he would like to see done in the vapor barrier area in regards to running tests and prosecuting the scene again. N2 told N3 and N4 NOT to take their EOD bags and just concentrate on handling the dirty assaulters and to notionalize that they were prosecuting the lab.

The assault commenced and the same thing happened. Two assaulters were sprayed with an unknown agent in the same room by the hostile. N3 and N4 arrived on the scene and did almost the exact same procedures as they had on the previous drill, talking through each step and each tool that they would be using and briefing assaulters regarding safety. This time N3 and N4 decided that one of them was going to escort the dirty assaulters to the hotline outside of the cave to make sure they were properly processed out and that the proper information was passed to higher. N3 and N4 tried to radio N2 and N1. No reply. The caves were thick and communications were an issue. N2 never entered the cave during the assault. N3 then told N4 that he was going to escort the 2 dirty assaulters out and for N4 to proceed with EOD procedures as long as he had at least one other assaulter with him watching him. N4 agreed with N3 that escorting the dirty assaulters out was a solid plan. N3 left cave with the dirty assaulters. N4 backs out of the danger area and pushes up into the cave to observe assaulters and CRD performing dead checks and taking biometrics off of dead hostiles. 15 minutes later N2 bumps into N4 in the cave and asks why N3 left him there "alone". N4 explains that he is not "alone" because there are people all around. N4 explains that the lab area was prosecuted, everyone was safe, and N4 was just standing by with the assault force awaiting further tasking. The drill was soon indexed and nothing negative was said by either N2 or N1 in regards to improper procedures by N3 or N4. At no time did either N2 or N1 ever even hint that they were questioning anything that happened on target that day. A few days later N2 and N1 gave a written concealing to N3 out of nowhere with no verbal warning at all for escorting assaulters to the hotline. Nothing was ever said to N4 regarding this.

It is my opinion that this counseling of EODC Hale was direct blowback from an e-mail that was written on deployment listing reasons why (b) (6) should remain off the team. EODC Hale and (b) (6) were never able to get past the issues that arose after (b) (6) left deployment which led to poor team performance at Desert Ice 9.

In closing, EODC Hale has always treated me with professional and personal respect. I never had any issues with him as an EOD Tech, Sailor, or person. He is a knowledgeable and proficient EOD Operator and always brought out the best in me.

(b) (6)

09APR17

Statement in Response to the Written Counseling Given on 31MAR2017

1. It is important to note that the written counseling was given in response to my actions on scene for an exercise/drill that we conducted for a second time with B/2/3 Troop Assaulters because the recommendation and establishment of a chemical decontamination station was never made prior to commencing. A major failure specifically on EOD team leadership (N1, (b) (6) and N2, (b) (6)). No verbal counseling or clarification for my actions while on scene was made on the day the actual exercise/drill was conducted on 29MAR2017 involving a nerve dispersal device inside a cave.
2. On conducting this exercise for the first time, EOD and CRD personnel were in direct support of the assault. Once the site was secure of OPFOR, I took control of the scene, in which I had two assaulters that had been sprayed with an unknown liquid. I had the two "dirty" assaulters self-decon using their RSDL and radioed for CRD to take control of these assaulters and escort them outside the cave, where they would be processed through the hotline and cut-out. I was then able to secure the scene of explosive hazards and identify the chemical hazards present.
3. On conducting the same exercise for the second time, EOD personnel were again in direct support of the assault and CRD personnel stayed behind to manage the hotline/decontamination station. N2, (b) (6) informed myself and N4, (b) (6) that we could notionally conduct EOD procedures on scene and that the focus would be on processing "dirty" assaulters through the hotline/decontamination station managed by CRD personnel. Once the site was again secure of OPFOR, I took control of the scene, again having two assaulters sprayed with an unknown liquid. I again had the two "dirty" assaulters self-decon using their RSDL and radioed for N2, (b) (6) to consolidate on my position and take control of the assaulters in escorting them to the hotline. After myself and N4, (b) (6) had made multiple attempts to radio N2, (b) (6) for support, called for two assaulters to provide security for N4, (b) (6) while he prepared a workstation and his tools outside the vapor barrier. Having the best situational awareness of the assaulter's condition and scene, decided to escort the two "dirty" assaulters to the hotline and turned over to CRD personnel for immediate decontamination and cut-out, coordinating this with N4, (b) (6) prior to departing.
4. As we were making our way outside the cave, I was confronted by N2, (b) (6) about what I was doing. I informed N2, (b) (6) that multiple attempts had been made to contact him via radio about the two "dirty" assaulters needing immediate decontamination and cut-out. He then asked about N4, (b) (6) whereabouts in which I notified him that he was on scene notionally preparing gear and supported by two assaulters. I then proceeded with the "dirty" assaulters out of the cave to the hotline and N2, (b) (6) proceeded to N4, (b) (6) location. Once the "dirty" assaulters were processed through the hotline and cut-out, B/2/3 troop leadership

Encl 3

requested one CRD personnel to proceed inside the cave and commence SSE processing. I in turn took over his position at the hotline.

- 5 (b) (6) and (b) (6) also informed me that in addition to this "safety violation" I had disregarded their request in coordinating the collection of AA&E from the RECCE 18F the morning of 28MAR2017, but was not included in the written counseling. I did Coordinate with the RECCE 18F pickup at 0715 that morning, (b) (6) and (b) (6) went prior to that time and without consulting the RECCE 18F or me, automatically assumed the coordination time had not been accomplished.

Safety Violations Observed during DI9

- 30MAR2017 Biological Laboratory with production of Botulinum Toxin
N2/ (b) (6) utilized poor threat assessment in having my primary test location on residual unknown powder from a machine that was turned off, disconnected, and obviously not used in the production/processing of the Botulinum Toxin instead of the unknown labeled liquid samples from inside the refrigerator and under the bio-hood. Testing locations were verified by Dugway Scientists on scene during the AAR.
- 05APR2017 Final Exercise with Impediments to Assault
N4/ (b) (6) was crouched over rendering safe a pressure plate IED and N1/ (b) (6) was observed peering over top of him. N1/ (b) (6) failed to move himself and the assault force back a safe distance until after N4/ (b) (6) had successfully rendered safe the IED and called the area safe to proceed through.
- 05APR2017 Final Exercise with Impediments to Assault
N2/ (b) (6) pressured the B/2/3 MSGT to leave the security cordon established and exploit the un-cleared back half of the building for any remaining IEDs. The troop MSGT had informed everyone that all personnel would enter/exit through the same cleared entry points and was not concerned with whatever was back there. N2/ (b) (6) left with one assaulter for security, only to return a short time later with one pressure plate IED that he unnecessarily went hands on and treated like a CAT A scenario instead of marking/BIP/remote procedures.



EODC Nathan Hale

EODTEU TWO

Executive Summary of Platoon Performance

CIN/COURSE:	EOD SOF - Surface IED	DATE:	Mar 2, 2016
Unit/Company/Platoon:	842	OIC/LCPD:	
EOD Supervisors:	EOD1 Hale		
Knowledge Test Average:	Pre-Test: NA	Post-Test: NA	Dives Conducted: SCUBA: NA MK16: NA
Practical Exercises:	Prac/Lab Drills: 36	Graded Drills Assessed: 14	Graded Drills Passed: 12
Grade Sheet Average/Score (s):	Platoon: 93.5	EOD Supervisor 1: 90.43	EOD Supervisor 3: EOD Supervisor 5:
		EOD Supervisor 2: 96.57	EOD Supervisor 4: EOD Supervisor 6:

Performance Evaluation Summary:

See attached document.

Training Safety Concerns:

ORIGINATOR:

SIGNATURE: _____

PLT 842 EXSUM

EOD/Diving Skills: (TEAM 1) (b) (6) displayed solid core EOD skills to include ordnance ID and understanding of related safeties. He showed a lack of experience during SOF EOD responses but absorbed information quickly. (b) (6) showed potential but required significant remediation with both core and advanced EOD skills early on, though he made vast improvements throughout training and was operating at an advanced capacity by the end of training. (TEAM 2) (b) (6) was deficient in core EOD skills, failing to properly articulate safeties or utilize K-factors when addressing safe standoff. He consistently lacked confidence in his EOD decisions and procedures, at one point failing to recognize a "CAT A" incident due to improper recon.

Combat Skills: The PLT lacked experience but showed improvement throughout training.

Mobility Skills: No deficiencies noted.

Situational Awareness: (TEAM 1) Team displayed a lack of SA early on, but made vast improvements by the end of course. (b) (6) required help with cardinal directions and was recommended to wear a wrist compass. Both members were receptive to feedback and implemented learning points during training. (TEAM 2) EOD1 Hale showed a lack of general SA, especially when using NVGs. He was unable to articulate cardinal directions when addressing withdrawal to the assault force.

Leadership/Team Dynamics: (TEAM 1) (b) (6) showed great leadership, articulated recommendations clearly, and communicated effectively with (b) (6). (b) (6) had to micromanage (b) (6) due to his deficiency with core skills. (b) (6) remained calm and collected during responses, however could have shown more urgency. (TEAM 2) EOD1 Hale and (b) (6) worked well together, but there was a clear lack of decisive leadership throughout training. EOD1 Hale lacked confidence in his EOD decisions and often relied on (b) (6) to verify or make decisions.

Material/Logistics: NSTR



EODTEU TWO

Executive Summary of Platoon Performance

CIN/COURSE: No CIN - Final Training Exercise (FTX) DATE: Mar 18, 2016

Unit/Company/Platoon: 842 OIC/I.CPO: (b) (6)

Team Leaders (TL): (b) (6) EOD1 Hale (b) (6)

Knowledge Test Average: Pre-Test: ☐ Post-Test: ☐ Dives Conducted: SCUBA: ☐ MK16: ☐

Practical Exercises: Prac/Lab Drills: ☐ Graded Drills Assessed: ☐ Graded Drills Passed: ☐

Grade Sheet Average/Score (s): Platoon: ☐ TL 1: ☐ TL 2: ☐ TL 3: ☐
TL 4: ☐ TL 5: ☐ TL 6: ☐

Performance Evaluation Summary:

(b) (6) - Performed well as a Platoon leader and EOD Operator. Although new to the role of SOF EOD Operator, (b) (6) will quickly overcome knowledge/skills shortfalls with training repetition. He makes a concerted effort to understand and correct mistakes after each training evolution. He consistently made good EOD calls and assault recommendations to the assault force.

EOD1 Hale - EOD1 Hale - Inconsistent demonstration of SOF EOD skills/capability for a Master EOD Tech. On some drills he carried the team and others he struggled with basic EOD skills (RECON/Ord ID) and the tactical threat assessment process. More iteration training with an emphasis on threat assessment and TTP selection/execution should be the short-term priority for EOD1 Hale.

Leadership/Team Dynamics:

(b) (6) have a great working relationship. Communication flow improved through the week. EODC Hayden led his platoon well, conducted leaders recon on complex multi layered evolutions then assisted the OIC in developing a plan of action.

Overall team dynamic and attitude was great. EOD1 Hale can be argumentative at times especially during stressful situations. Motivation was challenged on a few occasions, specifically when CBRN PPE was employed.

Training Safety Concerns:

None

ORIGINATOR: DIVISION LCPO

SIGNATURE: _____

Umayam, Benjamin A SCPO USN EODMU8 ROTA

From: (b) (6) (3SFG) (b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)
Sent: Monday, February 06, 2017 4:24 PM
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Subject: CPO Nathan Hale

My name is (b) (6). I wanted to contact you and let you know what a great job Nate did during our DTRA training in December. Nate and the rest of EOD were more than knowledgeable and took as much time as needed to help the Troop understand the process and repercussions of containing a contaminated sight and how to negotiate a complicated target set such as chem/bio in preparation for the exercise this spring. We really appreciate their effort and patience during this training. I was standing in as the Troop SGM and Nate helped to make it a seamless transition into my new position. When (b) (6) left, there was no noticeable gap in knowledge or what they could provide at any point. I hope this finds you well and I wanted to let you know how great your guys have been this rotation.

V/R

(b) (6)

AFRICOM CRF RECCE

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

USN EODMU8 ROTA

From:

(b) (6)

(3SFG)

(b) (6)(b) (6)

Sent:

Thursday, February 09, 2017 5:51 PM

To:

(b) (6)

Subject:

USN EODMU8 ROTA

Hale email

(b) (6)

I apologize for how my previous email has been perceived. I was unaware of the events taking place behind the scenes or of Nate's intentions. He asked me to write an email complimenting his work (which I found unusual but not pointless) during our week of DTRA training, and to our eyes, we found them helpful for the training and the guys appreciated it. All that being said, I have recently been informed of the "actual state of things" from the EOD leadership here and that behavior is unacceptable if true. I apologize for getting involved and please feel free to call me here in the OPCEN. I should be around for the next couple days and will gladly answer any questions you may have for me.

v/r

(b) (6)

AFRICOM CRF RECCE

(b) (6)

(b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Sent: Friday, February 10, 2017 8:27 AM
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA, (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Cc: (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA, (b) (6)
Subject: N2 Failures
Attachments: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

EODC Hale is not ready to be a platoon LCPO. He has anger issues and his inability to communicate with other EOD Chiefs proves to be a detriment during training and operations. His obvious disdain for (b) (6) and other EOD Chiefs overshadows the professional attitude expected from a Navy Chief and any member of the EOD community.

During NE TSG training (18-20 DEC in Stuttgart) his negative attitude about training filtered to the team creating an unprofessional team dynamic. His willingness to talk to his counterpart (b) (6) was not existent making it difficult to conduct training. I can get far too detailed about this subject, that can be another email or meeting in person.

(b) (6) made disparaging remarks about (b) (6) over a group text to the majority of troop 3, including the troop CDR and SGM. I ordered EODC Hale to counsel (b) (6) on his actions. He asked me to write up the counseling and I did. He returned and said that he was not having him sign what I wrote. After a very brief discussion, were I reminded him that this is clearly what happened and he will sign it, he said if that is an order I will do it. He tried to sea-lawyer me with semantics about (b) (6) not mentioning (b) (6) by name in the text. This made me question his ability to see the obvious. I have the pictures from the group text. The counseling paperwork is here (@ RAM) in the ISU and he is the only one who knows where it is. He was told to bring it to today's meeting. (b) (6)

EOD Hale has been vacant for the majority of N2 turnover issues before/after (b) (6) leave of absence and platoon turnover with 862. He refused to talk to (b) (6) on a number of occasions. He never contacted (b) (6) before 862 arrived. He was ordered by me to call (b) (6) to coordinate a time to have a meeting upon redeployment back to Rota. (b) (6) reported that he did call and the call was cut short and he could not reach EODC Hale after that call. No plans were made for the Platoon's post deployment meeting. Once (b) (6) and I talked about it we made the decision to have the meeting on Friday, 10 Feb at 1200L. Upon informing Chief Hale that we were having a meeting on Friday, he immediately started talking to me in an unprofessional manner and stated, something to the effect of "just because you and (b) (6) don't have families doesn't mean that you guys need to take this out on me." My rebuttal was to tone it down a few notches and he should have coordinated this with (b) (6) like I asked him to. He complied and left.

EOD Hale regularly let grooming standards for (b) (6) slip to the point where I was the one reminding him to shave. We all shaved at least every other day and (b) (6) has a good 4-5 day beard going most of the time. I made it a point to find him and tell him to shave if something was coming up.

(b) (6) turned his room over to (b) (6) in complete disarray. I am sure you have seen the pictures by now

EODC Hale and (b) (6) went on a ski trip that was allowed by me and the troop under the condition that all turnover was complete and they could be reached. I would complete the comms check and the AA&E inv and turnover would be complete. (b) (6) was staying back with me in case issues came up. 862 conducted the AA&E inventory with me monitoring. We are missing 20' of MMS1, 600gr per foot ECT. I sent a EODC Hale a text on Tuesday, 7th at pm

Weapons movement was not scheduled for the day of departure and I did it the day before.

Once EODC Hale and (b) (6) left for their ski trip, I had a feeling that the turnover was not as tight as EOD Hale indicated before departure.

Thank you,
V/R

Command Cell

(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)

(b) (6) (b) (6)

RECORD OF COUNSELING

DATE 16-Feb-2017

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

The authority for requesting the following information is contained in 10USC 8012 and EO 9397. The data will be used to document quality force counseling actions not prescribed in other directives. When completed the form may or may not become a source document to support administrative separation. Data is also releasable to higher headquarters officials when used to support administrative separation or UCMJ action. Completion of the form by a counselor is mandatory; however, disclosure of information or facts by the counselee is voluntary. Failure to disclose information or facts may not be in counselee's best interest in the event administrative, disciplinary or separation action is subsequently deemed warranted by the counselee's commander.

Name (Last, First Middle Initial)

Grade

SSN

Hale, Nathan J

CPO/E-7

DIVISION/WORK CENTER/DUTY SECTION
N3 / OPS

NAME/GRADE OF COUNSELOR

(b) (6)

REASON FOR COUNSELING

- ☐ MID MARKING PERIOD APPRAISAL
☐ END OF MARKING PERIOD APPRAISAL
☒ PERSONAL BEHAVIOR
☐ SUPPORT OF DEPENDENTS
☐ SUBSTANDARD DRESS/APPEARANCE

- ☒ PERFORMANCE
☐ PRIVATE INDEBTEDNESS
☐ OJT PROGRESS
☒ RESPONSIBILITIES
☐ OTHER - Specify)

RESUME OF REASON WHICH CAUSED THE COUNSELING REQUIREMENT (Give details, facts, specific dates, names, sequence of events, etc)

- On 27NOV2016 (b) (6) had a personal family problem in which he left the deployment on emergency leave. You were tasked to move into the PLT LCPO role. Your lack of perceived leadership as reflected by the actions of your subordinates resulted in inappropriate discussions amongst the junior personnel as to their disapproval of (b) (6). These discussions were held not only between the members of PLT 842, but at the B/2-3 Troop level as well as other members of EODMU 8. Rather than resolving the issues and mentoring your junior personnel, you perpetuated the problem by sending an official correspondence to the Company LCPO with the intention of presenting the argument that (b) (6) was unfit to resume the duties of PLT 842 LCPO.
- During the RIP / TOA phase of your deployment with PLT 862, your lack of supervision as the acting LCPO and only Master EOD Technician on the team resulted in a less than satisfactory turnover with the oncoming team. Multiple discrepancies were noted in your management of demolition inventory. These issues were identified while you were on a ski trip during the turnover. You left the deployment prior to turnover completion as the demo inventory was not resolved until four days after you redeployed.

-Due to a direct lack of oversight on your part as LCPO, your ISUs did not make it on to the CTF-63 aircraft dedicated to your Platoon and Platoon 841's redeployment. Regardless of the inspection circumstances you encountered with the USAF at Rammstein Air Base, your failure as the LCPO to follow up and confirm movement status prior to the day of departure, caused a missed movement which cost the Navy thousands of dollars in wasted aircraft space.

-Your general lack of leadership led to one of your subordinates departing deployment and leaving his room in completely unacceptable condition for turnover. This along with other issues prompted your Platoon Commander to initiate correspondence to Mobile Unit 8 Operations Department requesting that you be removed from the team.

SOLUTION THAT YOU AND THE INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPED AND DISCUSSED TO OVERCOME THE PROBLEM(S) AND PRECLUDE FUTURE INVOLVEMENT. (Outline all

solutions and indicate which one(s) individual freely elected)

- Review your roles and responsibilities as a Chief Petty Officer and Master EOD Technician. Clearly understand and perform your duties to an acceptable standard

- Your team will execute numerous drills and will need to prove to EODMU 8 leadership that you and your Platoon can effectively handle the mission in which you have been assigned. You are now under the microscope and this concludes any verbal counseling you receive for your failures

OTHER AGENCIES INDIVIDUAL REFERRED:

COUNSELEE's COMMENTS:

COUNSELEE's SIGNATURE

COUNSELOR's SIGNATURE

REMARKS/FOLLOW-UP ACTION(Outline all efforts indicating dates, names, progress, etc.)

KEY COUNSELING POINTS

- * Counseling is performed to solve a problem or to fulfill a need. Determine interview objective prior to meeting; review available records, and arrange office seating for best results.
- * Give the individual the facts whether they are pleasant or unpleasant
- * Be a good listener---Be fair.
- * Refer individual to other base agencies for professional help You don't have the answers to all the problems.
- * Follow-up on referrals to base agencies to make certain that there is a continuity of action and that referrals are complete.
- * Keep the individual's problems confidential.
- * Help the person to grow in self-understanding.
- * DO-NOT lose your self control. The results could be disastrous
- * DO-NOT make promises you can't keep.
- * DO-NOT make snap decisions.
- * DO-NOT forget to document the counseling and have the counselee sign the counseling sheet

RECORD OF ENLISTED COUNSELING		DATE
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT The authority for requesting the following information is contained in 5 U.S.C. sec. 301, 10 U.S.C. 5947, 44 U.S.C. sec. 3101, and Executive Order No. 9397. This information will be used to document quality force counseling actions not prescribed in other directives. Department of the Navy personnel may also use the information for evaluations and determinations in disciplinary, punitive and/or administrative actions. Disclosure of this information is voluntary.		
NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	GRADE	SSN
DIVISION/WORK CENTER/DUTY SECTION OPS/PL1 842	NAME/GRADE OF COUNSELOR [REDACTED]	
REASON FOR COUNSELING <input type="checkbox"/> PERFORMANCE <input type="checkbox"/> RESPONSIBILITIES <input type="checkbox"/> OJT PROGRESS <input type="checkbox"/> CAREER ADVANCEMENT <input type="checkbox"/> SUPPORT OF DEPENDENTS <input type="checkbox"/> PRIVATE INDEBTEDNESS <input type="checkbox"/> SUBSTANDARD APPEARANCE <input type="checkbox"/> PERSONAL BEHAVIOR <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify) <u>Expectations and Accountability</u>		
REASONS WHICH CAUSED THE COUNSELING REQUIREMENT (Give facts, details, sequence of events, specific dates, etc.) <p>This counseling is to document the expectations of each platoon member and the standards to be held by each member.</p> <p>All Members-</p> <p>Communication- The chain of command goes up and down. Communicate all pertinent information, to ensure parties in and outside the platoon are on track.</p> <p>Accountability- We are all accountable for our actions. If you have to ask yourself "should I be doing this" than you probably should not.</p> <p>Loyalty- This platoon will be together for a 32 month FRTTP. The mission should be our first priority. We need to train countless hours to develop into proficient operators and not kill each other during this process it.</p> <p>OIC(N1)- Our commander is overall responsible for this platoon to compete the mission. Hots, cots and administration.</p> <p>LCPO(N2)- Senior enlisted leader. Ensure proper training of the platoon, responsible to the platoon commander. Platoon LCPO must ensure that all member have the proper training and tools to complete the mission. Long and short term training plan. I cannot help you if I don't know. I may not have the best idea but my job is to recognize the best idea.</p> <p>LPO(N3)- In charge of the platoon day to day operations. You run the platoon! Communicate your intension to the COC. If the LPO cannot competently execute the platoon functions the LCPO will take over the LPO position.</p> <p>ALPO(N4)- Assist the LPO in all platoon functions to include all collateral duties and qualifications Sweep the floor.</p> <p>Welcome to the family.</p>		



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDING OFFICER
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL
MOBILE UNIT EIGHT
PSC 819 BOX 10
FPO AE 09545-0010

5800
Ser N00/121
1 Mar 17

From: Commanding Officer, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit EIGHT

To: EODC Nathan J. Hale, USN

Subj: NON-PUNITIVE LETTER OF CAUTION

Ref: (a) Rule for Courts-martial 306, MCM (2014)
(b) JAGMAN 0105

1. While serving as Platoon Chief Petty Officer (CPO) and acting Leading Chief Petty Officer (LCPO) of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Platoon 842 your team's equipment was not properly prepared for redeployment back to NAVSTA Rota, Spain on 9 Feb 17. Your platoon's misstep caused the Mobile Unit to expend unneeded TADTAR and effort to arrange an additional flight for your equipment. After looking into the reasons why the incident happened, your chain of command identified several significant issues on your platoon. First, your LCPO had a vision issue which was not addressed until well into your deployment by you in an effort to remove him from the team. Further, during turnover with Platoon 862, there were issues with AA&E accountability and one of your platoon member's room being turned over in disarray. These issues, among others, have caused concern over whether or not your platoon can function well enough in the future to complete its assigned mission. You are hereby administratively cautioned pursuant to references (a) and (b).

2. Remedial actions will consist of Extra Military Instruction (EMI) covering the following:

↓ a. As Platoon CPO, you will support the stability for your team. You will coordinate your actions with your OIC and LCPO in order to meet their intent. You will establish a high standard for your personnel while setting the example yourself. You will work with others on your platoon to ensure that your team meets mission requirements in all regards and, if you cannot, you will ask for assistance using the proper chain of command.

↑ b. You will ensure that all AA&E is properly inventoried and accounted for in accordance with applicable governing instructions.

Subj: NON-PUNITIVE LETTER OF CAUTION

↓ c. Your platoon will undergo intensive evaluation by EODMU 8 Readiness and Training Department and SOF Company Leadership at Exercise DESERT ICE 17 and follow-on training. I will be briefed on your platoon's performance and approve any additional deployment of your platoon.

↓ d. You must improve communication with your chain of command. This will work both ways: you will improve your communication to the SOF Company LCPO and Operations LCPO while expecting increased communication and assistance from your chain of command to you. Problems do not get better with time; effective communication is essential in fixing them.

3. This letter, being non-punitive in nature, is addressed to you as a corrective measure. It does not become a part of your official record. However, you are advised that, as a Chief Petty Officer in the EOD community, you are in a position of special trust. In the future, I expect you to exercise greater care in the performance of your duties in order to measure up to the high standards of this command.

4. I trust the instructional benefit you receive from this experience will heighten your awareness of the extent of your responsibilities and help you become a more proficient EOD LCPO.



Hale's Counseling for March 2017

1 March 17, 1000L, ESP, EODC Hale showed up for PLT quarters in PT gear when PLT CDR and LCPO were waiting in uniform. He walked through the PLT space and did not acknowledge PLT CDR and LCPO who were ready to conduct PLT quarters. This is only a three working days after a PG13 was signed by PLT members stating that PLT quarters would be held in uniform of the day at 1000L daily to improve PLT communications.

17 March 17, EODC Hale did not check on (b) (6) commercial air tickets as instructed during quarters on multiple days during the week prior to leaving on the weekend. During the day on Friday approximately 1300L, 17 March 17, PLT CDR asked (b) (6) if his tickets were paid for to leave on Sunday. His tickets were not paid for and his orders were not signed in order for CTO to book tickets.

19 March 17, EODC Hale clearly disregarded a text sent by PLT CDR over WhatsApp asking if (b) (6) himself made it in from Spain to the US. WhatsApp is a reliable means of communication that lets the user know when a message has been seen by the recipient.

26 March 17, approximately 2030L, Dugway Proving Ground, EODC Hale was instructed by (b) (6) to coordinate a time to draw weapons with (b) (6) on the night before the first walkthrough day for D19. EODC Hale failed to follow instructions by talking to the assault cell weapons Sergeant and not (b) (6) who is the RECCE Fox in charge of issuing EOD weapons. Once corrected he simply disregarded platoon leadership and further coordination was conducted by LCPO.

Chief Hale's lack of situational awareness and his ability to fully understand simple problem sets leads his direct supervisors to believe he is either incompetent to do the job or nefarious in his actions. He is defiant in all cases towards PLT leadership. His blatant disregard for direct orders leads to overall distrust and lack of team capability. Taking is bypassed to N4 at this time. Using the COC is ineffective with EODC Hale in the N3 position. Further counseling has been signed by EODC Hale during the month of March.

RECORD OF ENLISTED COUNSELING		DATE 30-Mar-2017
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT The authority for requesting the following information is contained in 5 U.S.C. sec. 301, 16 U.S.C. 5947, 44 U.S.C. sec. 3101, and Executive Order No. 9397. This information will be used to document quality force counseling actions not prescribed in other directives. Department of the Navy personnel may also use the information for evaluations and determinations in disciplinary, punitive and/or administrative actions. Disclosure of this information is voluntary.		
NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) HALE, NATHAN	GRADE E7	SSN
DIVISION/WORK CENTER/DUTY SECTION PI 1 N42	NAME/GRADE OF COUNSELOR [REDACTED]	
REASON FOR COUNSELING <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PERFORMANCE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RESPONSIBILITIES <input type="checkbox"/> DUTY PROGRESS <input type="checkbox"/> CAREER ADVANCEMENT <input type="checkbox"/> SUPPORT OF DEPENDENTS <input type="checkbox"/> PRIVATE INDEBTEDNESS <input type="checkbox"/> SUBSTANDARD APPEARANCE <input type="checkbox"/> PERSONAL BEHAVIOR <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify) _____		
REASONS WHICH CAUSED THE COUNSELING REQUIREMENT (Give facts, details, sequence of events, specific dates, etc.) During training evolutions EODC HALE's performance as an EOD Team Leader and EWS qualified CPO was unacceptable. 29 MAR 2017 Early in a chemical drill EODC HALE returned up range without notification of the EOD work center supervisor and leaving a subordinate EOD tech down range alone. When asked about the reason for returning up range by N2 his answer was "I am contaminated, [REDACTED] and I talked through it." When asked by N1 at the hot line "What do we have down range?" EODC's answer was "we have the same thing". Are you dirty? "No I did not go inside the vapor barrier." 30 MAR 2017 During a biological drill EODC HALE began sampling with out notifying the downrange supervisor. When asked why was this sample point being used his answer was not understood. The sample point was negative and further sample points were needed.		

PLAN (DEVELOPED BY THE MEMBER AND COUNSELOR) TO CONTINUE SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE OR TO OVERCOME PROBLEMS AND PRECLUDE FUTURE INVOLVEMENT

Outline all actions to be taken by the member and the counselor personally, including the dates.

If EODC Hale cannot be an effective LOD Team leader, LOD Master tech and N3, he will be fired and serve as N4.

Counselor

Member

☒ do not desire to make a statement.

I will discuss this at a later time

M. Hale

Member

RECORD OF ENLISTED COUNSELING		DATE 12-Apr-2017
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT The authority for requesting the following information is contained in 5 U.S.C. sec. 301, 10 U.S.C. 5947, 44 U.S.C. sec. 3101, and Executive Order No. 9397. This information will be used to document quality force counseling actions not prescribed in other directives. Department of the Navy personnel may also use the information for evaluations and determinations in disciplinary, punitive and/or administrative actions. Disclosure of this information is voluntary.		
NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) Hale, Nathan	GRADE E-7 CPO	SSN
DIVISION/WORK CENTER/DUTY SECTION N3 OPS	NAME/GRADE OF COUNSELOR	
REASON FOR COUNSELING <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PERFORMANCE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RESPONSIBILITIES <input type="checkbox"/> DUTY PROGRESS <input type="checkbox"/> CAREER ADVANCEMENT <input type="checkbox"/> SUPPORT OF DEPENDENTS <input type="checkbox"/> PRIVATE INDEBTEDNESS <input type="checkbox"/> SUBSTANDARD APPEARANCE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PERSONAL BEHAVIOR <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify) _____		
REASONS WHICH CAUSED THE COUNSELING REQUIREMENT (Give facts, details, sequence of events, specific dates, etc.) <p>Counseling submitted as follow on from 16 FEB 17 performance counseling and 01MAR17 NPLOC. The following are noted performance and behavior shortfalls observed during exercise Desert Ice 9.</p> <p>Leadership as a Chief Petty Officer:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ineffective communication with PLT, CoC, supported unit. - Lack of professionalism. - Significant personality conflicts with OIC & LCPO. - Lack of professional knowledge. <p>Technical capability as a Chief Master Tech:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Failure to provide guidance to supported unit and subordinate throughout pre and post assault. - Failure to control the downrange scene. - Lack of situational awareness. - Provided zero input throughout D19 to supported unit or PLT. <p>As per the NPLOC you received on 01MAR17 from [REDACTED], you were tasked with supporting the stability of your PLT, meeting the intent of your PLT leadership, setting an example to be emulated by your personnel, and improving communication with your Chain of Command. Throughout the pre-planning, movement and execution phases of this exercise, you were extensively briefed on the command's expectations. You failed to meet the aforementioned expectations outlined by the NPLOC, previous counsellings, and your chain of command.</p>		

PLAN (DEVELOPED BY THE MEMBER AND COUNSELOR) TO CONTINUE SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE OF
TO OVERCOME PROBLEM(S) AND PRECLUDE FUTURE INVOLVEMENT.

1. The 10. Refutations discussed and indicate which actions the member has personally, directly or indirectly.

It is apparent that EODC Hale has a lack of respect for his superiors, the uniform he wears, and the warfare insignia present on that uniform. His personality conflicts with platoon leadership and lack of understanding with regards to the importance of SOF small unit cohesion and technical proficiency has the potential to place his teammates in danger. Recommend EODC Hale be removed from PLT 842 based on these observations. Furthermore, if EODC Hale wishes to maintain his current NEC, he should be required to produce ample justification as to why he should be afforded the inherent authority, responsibility, and opportunity.

Signature of Counselor/Date

Signature of Member/Date

☒ I do not desire to make a statement.

I TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR MY PART IN THE FAILURE OF THIS TEAM DYNAMIC AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE VOCAL IN VOICING THE SAFETY CONCERNS FOR THE SPECIFIC DRILLS RUN WITH THE SOF CTF TROOP THAT I HAD FAILED IN BEING ADDRESSED. I HAVE LEARNED FROM ALL THE MISTAKES MADE WITHIN THIS TEAM AND HAVE NO DOUBT THAT I WILL COME OUT, A STRONGER AND MORE DECISIVE EOD TECH

W. J. Hale 13 APR 17

NAVPER 1616-25 (5-90)

1. NAVPER 1616-25 (5-90)

ADMINISTRATIVE REMARKS
NAVPERS 1070/513



SHIP OR STATION: EODMU 8

SUBJECT: NEC REMOVAL

PERMANENT: Yes

AUTHORITY: MILPERSMAN 1220-102

04/28/2017

Recommend removal of NEC 5337 due to my lack of confidence in the abilities of EODC Nathan J. Hale to exercise sound judgment and reliability to execute high-risk operations. The member is considered suitable for assignment to role or rating billets not requiring NEC 53XX

04/28/2017

I understand removal of my assigned NEC 5337 will result in stoppage of special or hazardous duty pay and reassignment to a non-NEC billet not necessarily at my present command


NATHAN JAMES HALE

Witnessed


ADMIN OFFICER

NAME (LAST, FIRST MIDDLE)

HALE NATHAN JAMES

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

BRANCH AND CLASS

USN

NAVPERS 1070-513

Official NSIPS/ESR form printed this date: 04/27/2017

Page 1 of 1

The data contained herein is protected by the Privacy Act of 1974. All measures required to protect this information should be taken.

NAVY ENLISTED CLASSIFICATION (NEC) CHANGE REQUEST
NAVPERS 1221/6 (Rev. 09-2013)

Supporting Directive MILPERSMAN 1221-021

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

This statement is provided in compliance with the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 which required that Federal Agencies must inform individuals who are requested to furnish information about themselves as to the following facts concerning the information requested.

AUTHORITY: 5 U.S.C., Departmental Regulations and E.O. 9397 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE(S): To access Member data on the Enlisted Assignment Information System (EAIS) and Inactive Manpower and Personnel Management Information System (IMAPMIS).

ROUTINE USE(S): To process award(s), removal(s), and waivers(s) as requested on the NAVPERS 1221/6.

DISCLOSURE: If the Service Member does not provide the SSN, the request will not be processed.

1. TO (Select one) ☒ PERS-4013 ☐ NUCLEAR

NEC Management Section, PERS-4013

2. FROM:

COMMANDING OFFICER

EODMU EIGHT

NAVSTA BAYVIEW

3. NAME (Last, First MI)

HALE, NATHAN J

4. RATE/RANK

FOIC 1-7

5. SSN

(b) (6)

6. UIC

55568

7. DATE

Apr 28, 2017

8. COMPONENT (If USNR, Complete block 9)

USN

9. RESERVE CLASSIFICATION

10. NEC ACTION REQUEST

NEC REMOVAL

11. NEC(s) REQUESTED

5337 - MASTER FOD TECHNICIAN

12. AMPLIFYING REMARKS

-RECOMMEND REMOVAL OF NEC DUE TO MY LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN HIS ABILITIES TO EXERCISE SOUND JUDGMENT AND RELIABILITY TO EXECUTE HIGH-RISK OPERATIONS.

-THE MEMBER IS CONSIDERED FOR ASSIGNMENT TO RATE BILLETS NOT REQUIRING NEC 53XX.

-THE MEMBER IS UNSUITABLE FOR DUTY IN DIVER LOD SEAL SWCC UCT COMMANDS. THE MEMBER MAY NOT REAPPLY FOR REINSTATEMENT FOR NEC 53XX AND IS UNSUITABLE FOR DIVER LOD SEAL SWCC UCT COMMANDS.

13. CERTIFYING OFFICER NAME

(b) (6)

14. COMMAND PHONE

(b) (6)

15. DSN PHONE

(b) (6)

16. SIGNATURE OF CERTIFYING OFFICER

(b) (6)

17. DATE

Apr 28, 2017

18. COMMAND FOR NAME

(b) (6)

19. COMMAND POC E-MAIL ADDRESS

(b) (6)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PRIVACY SENSITIVE

NAVY ENLISTED CLASSIFICATION (NEC) CHANGE REQUEST
NAVPERS 1221/6 (Rev. 09-2013)

Supporting Directive MLPERSMAN 1221-021

PERS-4013 INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF THE NAVPERS 1221/6

- 5 UIC - COMMAND UNIT IDENTIFICATION CODE (UIC) TO WHICH MEMBER IS PERMANENTLY ATTACHED**
- 8 COMPONENT - SELECT APPROPRIATE OPTION FROM THE DROP-DOWN**
- 9 RESERVE CLASSIFICATION - MEMBERS OF USN LEAVE THIS FIELD BLANK. MEMBERS OF THE USNR SELECT APPROPRIATE OPTION FROM THE DROP-DOWN.**
- 10 NEC ACTION REQUESTS - SELECT THE APPROPRIATE OPTION FROM THE DROP-DOWN. ONLY IDENTICAL TRANSACTIONS MAY BE REPORTED ON A SINGLE FORM. WHEN MULTIPLE ACTIONS ARE BEING RECOMMENDED FOR DIFFERENT REASONS, SEPARATE FORMS MUST BE SUBMITTED**
- 11 NAVY ENLISTED CLASSIFICATION (NEC) - THE NEC(S) FOR WHICH THE ACTION IS REQUESTED**
- 12 AMPLIFYING REMARKS - A BRIEF STATEMENT EXPLAINING WHY THE REQUEST IS BEING SUBMITTED. FOR "COI COMPLETION" NEC(S) ANNOTATE THE COURSE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER THE MEMBER COMPLETED, AND ALSO INCLUDE SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION WITH THE NAVPERS 1221/6 IN ORDER TO EXPEDITE YOUR REQUEST**
- 16 SIGNATURE OF CERTIFYING OFFICER - AUTHORITY TO CERTIFY ROUTINE AWARD OF NEC(S) MAY BE DELEGATED BY THE COMMANDING OFFICER OR OFFICER IN CHARGE. HOWEVER, NEC REMOVALS AND ARCHIVE REQUESTS MUST BE SIGNED BY THE COMMANDING OFFICER OR THE ACTING OFFICER IN CHARGE**

IMPORTANT INFORMATION WHEN SUBMITTING A NAVPERS 1221/6

THE USE OF THIS FORM IS RESTRICTED TO NAVAL ACTIVITIES REPORTING NAVY ENLISTED CLASSIFICATION (NEC) DATA FOR INCLUSION INTO THE ENLISTED ASSIGNMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM (EAIS) AND INACTIVE MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM (IMAPMIS).

USN/USNR (FTSN/USNR-R (SELRES)) SUBMIT NAVPERS 1221/6 TO MIL_NEC_REQUEST@NAVY.MIL VIA ENCRYPTED E-MAIL

NOTE 1 IF SUBMITTING A REQUEST FOR THE SAME NEC FOR MORE THAN ONE MEMBER, ENTER "SEE ATTACHED" IN FIELD 3. LEAVE FIELDS 4 AND 5 BLANK, AND ATTACH A LIST OF THE APPLICABLE MEMBERS TO THE NAVPERS 1221/6. THE LIST MUST INCLUDE THE RATE, NAME, AND SSN FOR EACH MEMBER.

NOTE 2 ACTIVE - ALL NEC CHANGES SHOULD APPEAR ON YOUR NEXT COMMAND EDVR. RESERVE - ALLOW 7 TO 10 DAYS FOR CHANGES TO APPEAR ON YOUR COMMAND RUAD.

NOTE 3 THIS FORM IS NOT TO BE USED FOR DISTRIBUTION NEC (DNEC) CHANGE PROPOSALS. FOR DNEC CHANGES, REFER TO THE EDVR MANUAL (SUPERSINST 1080.53).

MAILING ADDRESS AND CONTACT INFORMATION

NAVY PERSONNEL COMMAND
PERS-4013 NEC LIGHT SECTION
5720 INTEGRITY DRIVE
MILLINGTON, TN 38055-3340
COMINT (501)874-4465/4571/4466 (OSN 882)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDING OFFICER
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL
MOBILE UNIT EIGHT
PSC 815 BOX 13
FPO AE 08945 7000

7000
Ser N1/248
27 Apr 17

From: Commanding Officer, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile
Unit EIGHT
To: Officer in Charge, Navy Personnel Support Activity
Detachment, Rota
Subj: STOP SPECIAL PAY ENTITLEMENTS ICO EODC NATHAN J. HALE

Ref: (a) DODFMR Vol. 7A Chapter 8
(b) DODFMR Vol. 7A Chapter 11
(c) DODFMR Vol. 7A Chapter 24

Encl: (1) NAVPERS 1221/6
(2) NAVPERS 1070/613

1. Per references (a) through (c), request the appropriate actions be taken to stop the below Special Pays for EODC Nathan J. Hale, USN, 229-35-2596, effective 28 April 2017.

2. As indicated in enclosures (1) and (2), member is no longer eligible to receive the following special pays:

- a. Special Duty Assignment Pay (SDAP)
- b. Demolition Pay
- c. Parachute Pay
- d. Diving Duty Pay

3. My point of contact is [REDACTED] and he can be reached at email: [REDACTED] or at DSN: 727-1872.

by direction

Healy, Gareth J CDR USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, March 01, 2017 3:12 PM
To: Healy, Gareth J CDR USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: Draft NPLOCs
Attachments: NPLOC Hayden.doc; NPLOC Gregrow.doc, NPLOC Hale.doc
Signed By: john keefe@eu.navy.mil

CO,

COA

(b) (5)(b) (5)(b) (5)

TDQ and v/r
XO

(b) (6)
Executive Officer
EODMU EIGHT / CTG 68.1
THUNDERSTEALERS

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

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(b) (6)

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(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

5800
Ser N00/145
1 Mar 17

From: Commanding Officer, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile
Unit EIGHT

To: EODC Nathan J. Hale, USN

Subj: NON-PUNITIVE LETTER OF CAUTION

Ref: (a) Rule for Courts-martial 306, MCM (2014)
(b) JAGMAN 0105

1. While serving as Platoon Chief Petty Officer (CPO) and acting Leading Chief Petty Officer (LCPO) of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Platoon 842 your team's equipment was not properly prepared for redeployment back to NAVSTA Rota, Spain on 9 Feb 17. Your platoon's misstep caused the Mobile Unit to expend unneeded TADTAR and effort to arrange an additional flight for your equipment. After looking into the reasons why the incident happened, your chain of command identified several significant issues on your platoon. First, your LCPO had a vision issue which was not addressed until well into your deployment by you in an effort to remove him from the team. Further, during turnover with Platoon 862, there were issues with AA&E accountability and one of your platoon member's room being turned over in disarray. These issues, among others, have caused concern over whether or not your platoon can function well enough in the future to complete its assigned mission. You are hereby administratively cautioned pursuant to references (a) and (b).

2. Remedial actions will consist of Extra Military Instruction (EMI) covering the following:

a. As Platoon CPO, you will support the stability for your team. You will coordinate your actions with your OIC and LCPO in order to meet their intent. You will establish a high standard for your personnel while setting the example yourself. You will work with others on your platoon to ensure that your team meets mission requirements in all regards and, if you cannot, you will ask for assistance using the proper chain of command.

b. You will ensure that all AA&E is properly inventoried and accounted for in accordance with applicable governing instructions.

Subj: NON-PUNITIVE LETTER OF CAUTION

c. Your platoon will undergo intensive evaluation by EODMU 8 Readiness and Training Department and SOF Company Leadership at Exercise DESERT ICE 17 and follow-on training. I will be briefed on your platoon's performance and approve any additional deployment of your platoon.

d. You must improve communication with your chain of command. This will work both ways: you will improve your communication to the SOF Company LCPO and Operations LCPO while expecting increased communication and assistance from your chain of command to you. Problems do not get better with time; effective communication is essential in fixing them.

3. This letter, being non-punitive in nature, is addressed to you as a corrective measure. It does not become a part of your official record. However, you are advised that, as a Chief Petty Officer in the EOD community, you are in a position of special trust. In the future, I expect you to exercise greater care in the performance of your duties in order to measure up to the high standards of this command.

4. I trust the instructional benefit you receive from this experience will heighten your awareness of the extent of your responsibilities and help you become a more proficient EOD LCPO.

(b) (6)

USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU 8 ROTA
Sent: Thursday, February 09, 2017 8:52 AM
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA; (b) (6) USN
Subject: EODMU8 ROTA
RE: (b) (6) PLT

CO,

Copy sir. Headed back to the command now.

TDQ and v/r
XO

(b) (6)

Executive Officer
EODMU EIGHT / CTG 68.1
THUNDERSTEALERS

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA
Sent: Thursday, February 09, 2017 07:49 AM Coordinated Universal Time
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU 8 ROTA; (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Subject: RE: (b) (6) PLT

XO,

(b) (6) just got called by (b) (6) and it appears the USAF is not going to release the ISUs because paperwork was not dropped off. The plan may be to fly bodies back and require a separate -63 run next week. If the PLT did not do what is required to get from point A to point B with all their shit, they are not a force to operating in a special way.

VR/
CO

TDQ

(b) (6)

Commanding Officer
EODMU EIGHT / CTG 68.1
THUNDERSTEALERS

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

TANDBERG IP 205.13.205.3 (Alias 1846)

*** FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY: Any misuse or unauthorized disclosure may result in both civil and/or criminal penalties.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU 8 ROTA
Sent: Thursday, February 09, 2017 07:47 AM Coordinated Universal Time
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA; (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Subject: RE: (b) (6)

CO,

Haven't heard anything and I checked with (b) (6) at 1800 yesterday. Will leave the gym and do some research.

TDQ and v/r
XO

(b) (6)
Executive Officer
EODMU EIGHT / CTG 68.1
THUNDERSTEALERS

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA
Sent: Thursday, February 09, 2017 07:41 AM Coordinated Universal Time
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU 8 ROTA; (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Subject: PLT

XO, CMC,
(b) (6) just informed me of the gear issue for the SOF PLT redeployment. Request you get more info before I lose my shit. If the PLT neglected to do their job and put their redeployment at risk that is going to cost the command or -63 more money, there will be disciplinary action.

VR/
CO

TDQ

(b) (6)
Commanding Officer

(b) (6)

USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, December 20, 2016 6:00 PM
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Cc: (b) (6) USN EODMU 8 ROTA; (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT
ROTA
Subject: [Non DoD Source] Re: (b) (6)

CMC,

I'd be happy to call, however, I don't have an updated recall sheet with me. The number I have is a stateside number. Can you get me a better number?

V/r,

(b) (6)

On Tuesday, December 20, 2016, (b) (6) wrote:

Team OMB,

Can one of you, whomever you feel is most appropriate, (b) (6) and let her know you are available if she needs anything. They are going through a tough time right now and I want her to know she has support from us here as well.

Let me know if you want to talk first.

Thanks,

r/

(b) (6)

Command Master Chief
EODMU EIGHT

(b) (6)

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(b) (6)

USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Sent: Thursday, July 06, 2017 6:27 PM
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA
Subject: RE: Wording for Hale pg13
Signed By: (b) (6)

Rgr.

CMC

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA
Sent: Thursday, July 06, 2017 6:26 PM
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Cc: (b) (6) USN EODMU 8 ROTA
Subject: RE: Wording for Hale pg13

CMC,
I am good with that to go smooth.
VR/
CO

TDQ

(b) (6)

Commanding Officer
EODMU EIGHT / CTG 68.1
THUNDERSTEALERS

(b) (6)

TANDBERG IP 205.13.205.3 (Alias 1846)

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-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Sent: Thursday, July 06, 2017 04:24 PM Coordinated Universal Time
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA

Cc: (b) (6) USN EODMU 8 ROTA
Subject: RE: Wording for Hale pg13

COA

(b) (5)

****ASSIGN FOR BEST OPPORTUNITY FOR RE-QUALIFICATION AND LEADERSHIP GROWTH.****

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA
Sent: Thursday, July 06, 2017 6:21 PM
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Cc: (b) (6) USN EODMU 8 ROTA
Subject: RE: Wording for Hale pg13

XO, CMC,
Please cut and paste the write up in the EVAL into email so I can review one last time.
VR/

TDQ

(b) (6)
Commanding Officer
EODMU EIGHT / CTG 68.1
THUNDERSTEALERS

(b) (6)

TANDBERG IP 205.13.205.3 (Alias 1846)

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-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Sent: Thursday, July 06, 2017 04:19 PM Coordinated Universal Time
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA
Cc: (b) (6) USN EODMU 8 ROTA
Subject: RE: Wording for Hale pg13

Yup, we talked already and I fronted what we were going to do. It doesn't have any official bearing, but I think it will give weight to the commander if they want to pursue a waiver for Hale. It will be up to TYCOM to approve/disapprove.

1221 and EVAL are chopped and ready as well. Do you want me to have Admin go smooth on the EVAL as well or do you need to look at it again?

CMC

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA
Sent: Thursday, July 06, 2017 6:14 PM
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Cc: (b) (6) USN EODMU 8 ROTA
Subject: RE: Wording for Hale pg13

CMC,

The below sent before I was done.

My desire to to finalize Chief Hale (from our end) before you leave so finding time tomorrow is high priority.

I assume ECM has jived on the language?

VR/
CO

TDQ

(b) (6)

Commanding Officer
EODMU EIGHT / CTG 68.1
THUNDERSTEALERS

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

TANDBERG IP 205.13.205.3 (Alias 1846)

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-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA
Sent: Thursday, July 06, 2017 04:05 PM Coordinated Universal Time
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Cc: (b) (6) USN EODMU 8 ROTA
Subject: RE: Wording for Hale pg13

CMC,

I am good with the verbiage and believe it encompasses the purpose of the decision. Please push to YNCS so Chief Hale can be delivered tomorrow.

TDQ

(b) (6)

Commanding Officer
EODMU EIGHT / CTG 68.1
THUNDERSTEALERS

(b) (6)

TANDBERG IP 205.13.205.3 (Alias 1846)

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-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Sent: Thursday, July 06, 2017 03:51 PM Coordinated Universal Time
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA
Cc: (b) (6) USN EODMU 8 ROTA
Subject: Wording for Hale pg13

Skipper,

Here is a rough chop on the page 13. Let me know if this meets the mark of

what you were thinking. All we need to do is send the final chop to YNCS and he will have the final draft pg13 done and ready for your signature.

COA

(b) (5)

r/

(b) (6)

Command Master Chief
FODMU FIGHT

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Sent: Wednesday, July 05, 2017 12:54 PM
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA
Subject: MFR
Attachments: MFR ICO EODC HALE.pdf
Signed By: (b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)

Sir,

Attached documents as requested.

V/r AO

(b) (6)

Admin Officer
EODMU 8
PSC 819 Box 10
FPO AE 09501-4503

(b) (6)

WARNING: This is an official Department of Defense communication. Some emails may be encrypted and require CAC certification to view. Emails, or their attachments, containing personally identifiable information are "For Official Use Only" (FOUO) - Privacy Sensitive - Any misuse or unauthorized disclosure can result in both civil and criminal penalties.

(b) (6)

USN EODMU EIGHT

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Sent: Friday, February 10, 2017 3:52 PM
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT
Subject: RE: CDB
Attachments: 6MO ICDP - HALE.pdf; 6MO ICDP (b) (6).pdf; PERIODIC CDB QUESTIONS (CPO) docx; PERIODIC CDB QUESTIONS docx
Signed By: (b) (6)
Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

Chief,

ICDP's are attached as you requested, also have them both fill out the questionnaire I attached, to get talking points before the board. Get those back to me next week and we'll set a date up for CDB's, but I'm pretty open next week.

V/r

(b) (6)

----- Original Message -----

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT
Sent: Friday, February 10, 2017 2:06 PM
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Subject: CDB

NC1,

Can I get ICDP for? We can set up a time soon, give me some options for dates.

(b) (6)

EODC Hale

V/R

(b) (6)

LCPO PLATOON 842
EODMU 8
ROTA, SPAIN

(b) (6)

EODMU 8
6 Month Individual Career Development Plan (ICDP) for:
EOD1 HALE, NATHAN JAMES

DEPT	DIV	Report: 6/24/2015	PRO 6/1/2018	ADSD 10/24/2005	EAOS 5/21/2020	SEADS 5/21/2020
ADVANCEMENT / EDUCATION / QUALIFICATIONS						
Current	Paygrade: E06	Date of Rate: 12/16/2012				
Advancement Timeline	E02:	E03	E04:	E05		
	E06:	E07 7/1/2015	E08:	E09		
Examination Participation	Number Times Taken: 1	Number Times Failed: 0	Number Times Board Eligible: 0			
Education	Highest Level: L - High School Diploma				USMAP Enrolled:	
	Degree Working Toward:		Start Date:			
Warfare Qualification	Warfare Working Toward:		Start Date:		Estimated Completion:	
PHYSICAL FITNESS PROGRAM						
PRT Data	1. FALL 2007 - -		5. 1 2014 - PARTICIPANT - MAXIMUM			
	2. 2 2015 - PARTICIPANT - MAXIMUM		6. 2 2013 - PARTICIPANT - MAXIMUM			
	3. 1 2015 - PARTICIPANT - MAXIMUM		7. 1 2013 - TAD -			
	4. 2 2014 - PARTICIPANT - MAXIMUM		8. 2 2012 - TAD -			
	Personal Goals Set:					
CAREER MANAGEMENT						
Reenlistment Intentions						
Career Waypoint Reenlistment	Year Group: 2006	C-WAY Status Date: 9/1/2014	C-Way Status Approved - Executed			
PCS Orders	Orders Received:	Welcome Aboard Package/Message Received.				
TRANSITION						
Transition Reason:	GPS Required:	DoL Workshop Exemption.				
Pre-Sep Completed:	DD 2648 Completed:	DoL Workshop Completed.			VA Briefing Completed	
Fleet Reserve Submitted:	Fleet Reserve Approved:					

EODMU 8
6 Month Individual Career Development Plan (ICDP) for:
EOD1 HALE,NATHAN JAMES

Notes from the 6 Month CDB held on 12/1/2015

Short Term Goals CDB NOT COMPLETED DUE TO TDY.

Long Term Goals

Board Members

Board Comments.

CCC COMMENTS. CDB WILL BE COMPLETED UPON RETURN FROM TDY TRAVEL. "EOD1 WAS ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE 2016 CPO EXAM DUE TO HIS CHIEF HAND CARRYING THE EXAM TO THE USA FOR ADMINISTRATION"

Notes from the Reporting CDB held on 7/22/2015

Short Term Goals REQUAL AND BECOME ASSET TO PLATOON, REVIEW RECORD FOR CPO

Long Term Goals. MAKE CPO BOARD. ADVANCE

Board Members. CMC, OIC, LCPO, CCC.

Board Comments

-DISCUSSED CPO BAORD PROCESS AND HOW TO ENSURE RECORD IS ACCURATE BEFORE IT CONVENES.
-BE GOOD AT YOUR JOB WHILE ONBOARD, AND HELP OTHERS TO BE GOOD AT THEIRS.
-UNDERSTAND THE FORMAL/INFORMAL GRIEVANCE PROCESS AND HOW TO UTILIZE IT EFFECTIVELY
-KNOW YOUR CWAY WINDOW AND UNDERSTAND WHEN YOUR PERSONNEL ARE ENTERING THEIRS AS WELL.
-HELP CONDUCT CDB'S IN YOUR PLATOON. KNOW WHAT TRIGGERS ONE FOR YOUR SAILORS.
-DISCUSSED LADR AND IT'S USE IN CAREER PLANNING.
-WORK ON PPME/JPME WHEN YOU ARE ABLE. THEY MAKE A DIFFERENCE WHEN GETTING LOOKED AT FOR CPO
-PRINT THE CPO PRECEPTS AND USE THEM AS A REFERENCE FOR EVALUATIONS!
"CONSIDER SUBMITTING A STATEMENT IRT YOUR LAST EVALUATION. IT WAS A TRANSFER EVAL AND YOU WERE RANKED 1 OF 1 MP"

CCC COMMENTS EOD1 LET ME KNOW HOW I CAN HELP YOU ACHIEVE YOUR CAREER GOALS, OR THOSE OF THE PERSONNEL IN YOUR PLATOON.

(b) (6)

USN EODMU EIGHT

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2015 4:01 PM
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT
Subject: RE: SOQ/JSOQ R:\ALL_DRIVE\01 Administrative\SOQ 2015\4TH QTR

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

(b) (6)

This is what I have off the paperwork alone...

1. (b) (6)
2. (b) (6)
3. (b) (6)
4. EOD1 Hale (37)

Unfortunately, it's next to impossible for EOD techs to compete with some of these guys because of the opportunities provided to them just because they are here at the command all the time... Our guys need to get outside of their detachments to be competitive in any way/shape/form...

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT
Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2015 2:22 PM
To: M-RO-EODMU8-CHIEFS-GS
Subject: SOQ/JSOQ R:\ALL_DRIVE\01 Administrative\SOQ 2015\4TH QTR

ALCON,

Please access the share drive location for SOQ packages and grade sheet. Once graded send me your scores for each individual. I will have the results prior to oral board.

We will be changing the location of the board to the RNT boardroom. Using the backdoor not to disturb classroom.

V/R

(b) (6)

LCPO PLATOON 842
EODMU 8

(b) (6)

ADMINISTRATIVE REMARKS			
NAVPERS 1070/513 (REV. 08-2012) PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE		SUPPORTING DIRECTIVE MILPERSMAN 1070-320	
SHIP OR STATION			
LORDSVILLE			
SUBJECT		<input type="checkbox"/> PERMANENT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TEMPORARY	
Platoon 842 Counseling: Division Officer Record Entry		AUTHORITY (IF PERMANENT)	
<p>Platoon 842 counseling: Effective dates 24 February 2017 to 1 July 2017</p> <p>No first names will be used between platoon 842 members unless they are the same rank. Junior and senior personnel are expected to address senior and junior personnel by their rank or rank and last name.</p> <p>JMI will be completed IAW Navy standards.</p> <p>Weekly zone inspections will be held on the last day of the work week at 1600. Inspection areas are room 114, ISUs and platoon cage located in hanger.</p> <p>All grooming standards will be met IAW Navy regulations.</p> <p>Conduct weekly inventory of AA&E, sensitive items and secrets.</p> <p>Conduct monthly inventory of all platoon gear.</p> <p>Common areas will be cleaned on weekly bases. Including sweeping and swabbing of p-way in front of platoon office medical and p-way from Quarterdeck to T intersection by copier.</p> <p>Working hours will be from 0800-1700. Clean shave required at 0800 muster.</p> <p>On off command PT days (Tuesday and Thursday) all platoon members will meet in shop before individual PT at 0800. PT</p> <p>Uniform of the day will be NWU Type IIIs.</p> <p>PT uniform is authorized from 0800-1000 unless work permits PT uniform.</p> <p>PT uniform is blue or brown t-shirt with black shorts.</p> <p>Duty quarters will be held at 1000. Command quarters takes precedence and platoon quarters will be held immediately after command quarters.</p> <p>The remainder of the team time will be planned. All training evolutions will be executed on schedule unless command or troop training interferes with platoon training.</p> <p>Regardless of performance, monthly counseling will be conducted on all members of PLT 842.</p> <p>No cell phones or wireless devices in restricted spaces.</p> <p>Seasonal uniform change inspection will be conducted within two weeks of uniform shift.</p>			
ENTERED AND VERIFIED IN ELECTRONIC SERVICE RECORD			
VERIFYING OFFICIAL RANK OR GRADE/TITLE	DATE	SIGNATURE OF VERIFYING OFFICIAL	
NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE)		SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	BRANCH AND CLASS

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PRIVACY SENSITIVE

(b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA

From: (b) (6) EODGRU2, N00 (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, April 17, 2017 10:28 PM
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA
Cc: (b) (6) COMEODGRU2, CSO; (b) (6) EODGRU 2, N3;
(b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA; (b) (6) USN EODMU 8
ROTA; (b) (6) EODGRU 2, N02; (b) (6) USN
EODMU8 ROTA; (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA; (b) (6)
(b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA; (b) (6) EODGRU TWO, N7
Subject: RE: PLT 841/842 reorg and implications
Signed By: (b) (6)

Gareth,

As discussed, I appreciate your leadership in this matter.

COAs

(b) (5)(b) (5)(b) (5)(b) (5)(b) (5)(b) (5)(b) (5)

Vr,

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, April 17, 2017 11:21 AM
To: (b) (6) EODGRU2, N00
Cc: (b) (6) COMEODGRU2, CSO; (b) (6) EODGRU 2, N3; (b) (6)
(b) (6); (b) (6) EODGRU 2, N02; (b) (6)
(b) (6)
Subject: PLT 841/842 reorg and implications

CDRE,

COA's

(b) (5)

(b) (5)
(b) (5)
(b) (5)
(b) (5)

COA

COA

Standing by for any questions or concerns.

TDQ and VR/

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Commanding Officer

(b) (6)

USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA
Sent: Thursday, April 27, 2017 6:03 PM
To: (b) (6) EODGRU2, N00
Cc: (b) (6) COMEODGRU2, CSO, (b) (6) USN EODMU 8 ROTA,
(b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA, (b) (6) EODGRU
2, N02
Subject: RE: NEC Removal intent
Signed By: (b) (6)(b) (6)

Sir,

No necessary support at this time.

To be clear, I have lost faith and confidence in EODC Hale's ability to exercise sound judgement and reliability to execute high-risk operations required of an EOD Technician (53XX).

I cannot echo this testament for Chief Hale's ability to serve in our Navy. As such, I will forward my recommendation to remove his NEC WITH an a finding of suitability for assignment to another rating, accordingly.

TDO and VR/

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

*** FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY: Any misuse or unauthorized disclosure may result in both civil and/or criminal penalties. ***

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) EODGRU2, N00 [mailto:(b) (6)]
Sent: Thursday, April 27, 2017 1:00 AM
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA
Cc: (b) (6) COMEODGRU2, CSO, (b) (6) USN EODMU 8 ROTA, (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA, (b) (6) EODGRU 2, N02
Subject: RE: NEC Removal intent

(b) (6)

Copy, let me know if you need any support from Group

Vr,

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Wednesday, April 26, 2017 10:05 AM

To: (b) (6)

EODGRU2, N00

Cc: (b) (6)

COMEODGRU2, CSO; (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

EODGRU 2, N02

Subject: NEC Removal intent

CDRE,

COA

(b) (5)
(b) (5)

COA

TDQ and VR/

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Commanding Officer

EODMU EIGHT / CTG 68.1

THUNDERSTEALERS

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA
Sent: Friday, April 28, 2017 2:29 PM
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU 8 ROTA; (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Subject: RE: EODC Hale Documents
Signed By: (b) (6)

XO,

Thanks.

TDQ and VR/
CO

(b) (6)

*** FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY: Any misuse or unauthorized disclosure may result in both civil and/or criminal penalties. ***

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) USN EODMU 8 ROTA
Sent: Friday, April 28, 2017 2:29 PM
To: (b) (6) USN EODMU EIGHT ROTA; (b) (6) USN EODMU8 ROTA
Subject: EODC Hale Documents

CO, CMC,

I've scanned a copy of all of the counseling sheets and administrative forms pertaining to EODC Hale's NEC removal. They're located on the share drive at R:\NO\N01 - XO Files\S- Legal. A hard copy is also in my cabinet which I will leave upon turnover. I will maintain a copy of the documents in my personal account for future reference as well.

TDQ and v/r
XO

(b) (6)

Executive Officer
EODMU EIGHT / CTG 68.1
THUNDERSTEALERS